Resurrection of the Body

Tertullian, On the Flesh of Christ 12

Tertullian · c. 155–c. 220 AD

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Now let the soul be displayed through flesh, if it has been established that it had to be displayed in some way—that is, as something unknown to itself and to us. Though in this matter the distinction is an empty one, as if we existed apart from the soul, when everything we are is soul. Without soul we are nothing—not even the name of man, but of corpse. If we do not know the soul, then the soul does not know itself. So the only thing left to examine is whether the soul was ignorant of itself here, so that it might become known in some way.

In my opinion, the soul's nature is capable of sensation. No animal is without sensation, and nothing capable of sensation is without soul. To put it more forcefully, sensation is the soul of the soul. Since the soul grants sensation to all things, and itself perceives the sensations of all things—not to mention their qualities—is it likely that it did not receive from the beginning a perception of itself? How would it know what is sometimes necessary for it, by the necessity of natural things, if it does not know its own quality, to which something is necessary? This can be recognized in every soul—I mean self-knowledge—and without this self-knowledge no soul could have served itself.

But I think it belongs more to man, the only rational animal, to have received a soul that makes him a rational animal, the soul itself being rational in the first place. How can it be rational, when it makes man a rational animal, if it does not know its own rationality, being ignorant of itself? But it is so far from ignorant that it knows its maker, its judge, and its condition. Though it has learned nothing yet about God, it names God, and though admitting nothing yet about his judgment, it commends itself to God. Hearing above all that there is no hope after death, it invokes a blessing or a curse on each one who has died well or badly. The little book I wrote, On the Testimony of the Soul, pursues these matters more fully.

Otherwise, if the soul had been ignorant of itself from the beginning, it ought to have learned nothing from Christ except what it was. But in fact it did not learn its form from Christ, but its salvation. The Son of God descended and took on a soul, not so that the soul might know itself in Christ, but so that it might know Christ in itself. For it is not endangered in its salvation by not knowing itself, but by not knowing the Word. Life, he says, was made manifest—not the soul. And I came, he says, to save the soul—he did not say to display it.

We were ignorant, of course, that the soul, though invisible, is born and dies, unless it were exhibited bodily. We were plainly ignorant that it would rise again with the flesh. This is what Christ made manifest. But he did this no differently in himself than in some Lazarus, whose flesh was not animal, just as his soul was not fleshly. What more, then, has been revealed to us about the previously unknown condition of the soul? What invisible aspect of it was there that desired visibility through flesh?

Latin

Ostensa sit nunc anima per carnem, si constiterit illam ostendendam quoquo modo fuisse, id est incognitam sibi et nobis. Quamquam in hoc vana distinctio est, quasi nos seorsum ab anima simus, cum totum quod sumus anima sit. Denique sine anima nihil sumus, ne hominis quidem, sed cadaveris nomen. Si ergo ignoramus animam, ipsa se ignorat. Ita superest hoc solummodo inspicere, an se anima hic ignorarit, ut nota quoquo modo fieret. Opinor, sensualis est animae natura. Adeo nihil animale sine sensu, nihil sensuale sine anima. Et ut impressius dixerim, animae anima sensus est. Igitur cum omnibus anima sentire praestet, et ipsa sentiat omnium etiam sensus, nedum qualitates, cui verisimile est ut ipsa sensum sui ab initio sortita non sit? Unde illi scire quod interdum sibi sit necessarium, ex naturalium necessitate, si non scit suam qualitatem, cui quid necessarium est? Hoc quidem in omni anima recognoscere est, notitiam sui dico, sine qua notitia sui nulla anima se ministrare potuisset. Puto sutem magis hominem, animal solum rationale, competere et animam esse sortitum quae illum faciat animal rationale, ipsa in primis rationalis. Porro quomodo rationulis quae efficit hominem rationale animal, si ipsa rationem suam nescit, ignorans semetipsam? Sed adeo non ignorat, ut auctorem et arbitrum et statum suum norit. Nihil adhuc de deo disocus deum nominst. Nihil adhuc de iudicio eius admittens deo comacendare ae dicit. Nihil magis audiens quam spem nullam esse post mortem et bens et male defuncto cuique imprecatur. Plenius haec prosequitur libellus quem scripsimus DE TESTIMONIO ANIMAE, Aliequin si anima semetipsam ignorans erat ab initio, nihil a Christo cognovisse debuerat nisi qualis esset. Nunc autem non effigiem suam didicit a Christo, sed salutem. Propterea filius dei descendit et animam subiit, non ut ipsa se anima cognosceret in Christo, sed ut Christum in semetipsa. Non enim se ignorando de salute periclitatur, sed dei verbum. Vita, inquit, manifestata est, non anima. Et veni, inquit, animam salvam facere, non dixit ostendere. Ignorabamus nimirum animam, licet invisibilem, nasci et mori, nisi corporaliter exhiberetur. Ignoravimus plane resurrecturam cum carne. Hoc erit quod Christus manifestavit. Sed et hoc non aliter in se quam in Lazaro aliquo, cuius caro non erat animalis, ita nec anima carnalis. Quid ergo amplius innotuit nobis de animae ignoratae retro dispositione? Quid invisibile eius fuit quod visibilitatem per carnem desideraret?

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