Tertullian — Against Marcion 1.26
But here it is enough to show a most perverse god in the very proclamation of solitary goodness, by which they refuse to ascribe to him such motions of mind as they blame in the Creator.
For if he neither rivals nor angers nor damns nor harasses—inasmuch as he does not even act as judge—I do not find how a rationale of disciplines stands for him, and indeed a fuller one.
For what sort of thing is it that he set precepts he will not execute, that he forbid offenses he will not avenge, because he will not judge—being a stranger, of course, to all senses of severity and punishment?
Why forbid what is to be admitted when he does not defend what was admitted—when it would be much more right not to have forbidden what he was not going to defend than not to defend what he had forbidden? Nay, he ought to have permitted it outright, about to forbid without cause as one not about to defend.
For even now that is silently permitted which is forbidden without vengeance. And surely he forbids nothing to be admitted except what he does not love to happen. Most stupid, then, is he who is not offended by a deed he does not love to happen, when offense is companion of a frustrated will. Or if he is offended, he ought to be angry; if angry, he ought to avenge—for vengeance is fruit of anger, anger the debt of offense, and offense companion of frustrated will. But he does not avenge; therefore he is not offended either.
Latin
At hic sufficit peruersissimum deum ostendi in ipso praeconio solitariae bonitatis, qua nolunt ei adscribere eiusmodi motus animi, quos in creatore reprehendunt. si enim neque aemulatur neque irascitur neque damnat neque uexat. utpote qui nec iudicem praestat, non inuenio, quomodo illi disciplinarum ratio consistat, et quidem plenior. quale est enim. ut praecepta constituat non executurus, ut delicta prohibeat non uindicaturus, quia non iudicaturus, extraneus scilicet ab omnibus sensibus seueritatis et animaduersionis? cur enim prohibet admitti quod non defendit admissum, cum multo rectius non prohibuisset quod defensurus non esset quam ut non defenderet quod prohibuisset? immo et permisisse directo debuit, sine causa prohibiturus, ut non defensurus. nam et nunc tacite permissum est quod sine ultione prohibetur. et utique non aliud prohibet admitti quam quod non amat fieri. stupidissimus ergo qui non offenditur facto quod non amat fieri, quando offensa comes sit frustratae uoluntatis. aut si offenditur, debet irasci; si irascitur, debet ulcisci. nam et ultio fructus est irae et ira debitum offensae et offensa, ut dixi, comes frustratae uoluntatis. sed non ulciscitur; ergo nec offenditur, si non offenditur, ergo nec laeditur uoluntas eius, cum fit quod noluit fieri: et fit iam delictum secundum uoluntatem eius. quia non fit aduersus uoluntatem quod non laedit uoluntatem. aut si hoc erit diuinae uirtutis siue bonitatis, nolle quidem fieri et prohibere fieri, non moueri tamen, si fiat, dicimus iam motum esse illum, qui noluit, et uane non moueri ad factum qui motus sit ad non faciendum. I quando noluit fieri; nolendo enim prohibuit. non autem et iudicauit nolendo fieri et idcirco prohibendo? non faciendum enim iudicauit et prohibendo pronuntiauit. ergo et ille iam iudicat. si indignum est deum iudicare, aut si eatenus dignum est deum iudicare, qua tantummodo nolit et prohibeat non etiam defendat admissum, atquin nihil deo tam indignum quam non exequi quod noluit et prohibuit admitti: primo, quod qualicunque sententiae suae et legi debeat uindictam in auctoritatem et obsequii necessitatem, secundo, quia (boni) aemulum sit necesse est quod noluit admitti et nolendo prohibuit, malo autem parcere deum indignius sit quam animaduertere, et quidem deo optimo, qui non alias plane bonus sit, nisi mali aemulus, uti boni amorem odio mali exerceat et boni tutelam expugnatione mali impleat.