Lactantius — Divine Institutes 6.12
This is that perfect justice which guards the human society of which the philosophers speak; this is the greatest and truest fruit of riches, not to use wealth for one person's private pleasure but for many people's salvation, not for one's present fruit but for justice, which alone does not perish. It must therefore be held in every way that from the office of mercy hope of receiving back be wholly absent: for the wage of this work and office is to be expected from God alone. For if you expect it from a human, that will already not be humanity but usury of a kindness, nor can he seem to have deserved well who what he does furnishes not to another but to himself. And yet the matter returns to the same, that what each has furnished to another hoping for no profit from him truly furnishes to himself, because he will take the wage from God. Likewise God commands that if ever we have prepared a dinner, we invite into the meal those who cannot invite back and return the turn, that every act of our life not lack the gift of mercy. Nor yet should anyone think communion with friends or affection with neighbors forbidden to himself, but God has made known to us what is the true and just work: so we ought to live with neighbors, provided we know that that belongs to the human, this to God.
The chief virtue therefore is hospitality, which the philosophers also say, but they twist it from true justice and snatch it to advantage. 'Rightly,' says Cicero, 'hospitality was praised by Theophrastus. For it is, as it seems to me at least, very fitting that the houses of illustrious humans stand open to illustrious guests.' In the same way he erred again as then, when he said one must give to the suitable. For the house of a just and wise man ought not to stand open to the illustrious but to the low and cast-down: for those illustrious and powerful can lack nothing, whom their wealth both fortifies and honors. But nothing is to be done by a just man except what is beneficent. But a kindness if it is returned perishes and is finished: for we cannot keep intact that whose price has been paid back to us. And so the reason of justice turns in those kindnesses which have remained safe and uncorrupted, and they remain not otherwise than if they are furnished to those humans who can by no means benefit. But he, in receiving the illustrious, looked at nothing else except utility and did not hide, clever man, what profit he hoped from it… How then would he defend that ambitious hospitality not be malice? … But this he not rather by carelessness — for what less fits Cicero? — but by ignorance of true right knowingly and wittingly led himself into these snares. Which that it may be forgiven him, he testified that he gives precepts not toward true justice, which he does not hold, but toward the shadow and image of justice. One must therefore forgive the shadowy and imaginary teacher, and truth is not to be demanded from him who confesses he does not know.
Ransom of captives is a great and splendid office of justice, which Tullius himself also approved. 'And this kindness,' he says, 'is useful even to the republic: that captives be redeemed from slavery, that the thin be enriched. I set this custom of kindness far before the largess of gifts; this belongs to weighty and great humans.' The proper work therefore of the just is to feed the poor and ransom captives… There therefore is justice where there is no bond of necessity for doing good. No less great a work of justice is to protect and defend orphans and widows destitute and needing help: which that divine law so prescribes to all, since even good judges think it belongs to their office to favor them by natural humanity and strive to benefit. But these works are properly ours, who have received the law, who have received the very words of God commanding. For they sense indeed by nature that it is just to protect those who lack guardianship, but why it is so they do not see through. For God, whose mercy is perpetual, commands widows and orphans to be defended and fostered for this reason, lest anyone by regard and pity for his own pledges be slowed from taking up death for justice and faith, but undergo it without delay and bravely, when he knows he leaves his dear ones to God and that protection will never fail them. To take up also the sick who lack one to attend them, to be cared for and fostered, is of highest humanity and great working: which who has done, this one will acquire a living victim for God and what he has given to another for a time he himself will receive from God into eternity. That last and greatest office of piety is burial of strangers and the poor: which those teachers of virtue and justice have wholly not touched… We will not therefore suffer the form and fashioning of God to lie as prey for beasts and birds, but we will give it back to the earth whence it arose… In what does the reason of justice consist more than in this, that what we furnish to our own through affection we furnish to strangers through humanity? Which is much surer and more just, when already it is furnished not to a human, who senses nothing, but to God alone, to whom a just work is the dearest sacrifice… Great is the wage of mercy, to which God promises that he will remit all sins. 'If you hear,' he says, 'the prayers of your suppliant, I also will hear yours: if you have pitied those laboring, I also in your labor will pity. But if you have not looked back nor helped, I also will bear your mind against you and will judge you by your own laws.'
Latin
Haec est illa perfecta iustitia quae custodit humanam de qua philosophi locuntur societatem, hic diuitiarum maximus ac uerissimus fructus est, non uti opibus ad propriam unius uoluptatem, sed ad multorum salutem, non ad praesentem suum fructum, sed ad iustitiam, quae sola non interit. tenendum est igitur omni modo ut ab officio misericordiae spes recipiendi absit omnino: huius enim operis et officii merces a deo est expectanda solo. nam si ab homine expectes, iam non humanitas erit illa, sed beneficii faeneratio, nec potest uideri bene meruisse qui quod facit non alteri, sed sibi praestat. et tamen res eodem redit, ut quod alteri quisque praestiterit nihil ab eo commodi sperans, uere sibi praestet, quia mercedem capiet a deo. item deus praecipit ut si quando cenam parauerimus, eos in conuictum adhibeamus qui reuocare non possint et uicem reddere, ut omnis actus uitae nostrae non careat misericordiae munere. nec tamen quisquam interdictum sibi putet aut communione cum amicis aut caritate cum proximis, sed notum nobis deus fecit quod sit uerum et iustum opus: ita nos oportet cum proximis uiuere, dummodo sciamus illut ad hominem, hoc ad deum pertinere.
praecipua igitur uirtus hospitalitas, quod philosophi quoque aiunt, sed eam detorquent a uera iustitia et ad commodum rapiunt. recte inquit Cicero a Theophrasto est laudata hospitalitas. est enim, ut mihi quidem uidetur, ualde decorum patere domus hominum inlustrium hospitibus inlustribus. eodem modo rursus errauit quo tum, cum idoneis esse diceret largiendum. non enim iusti et sapientis uiri domus inlustribus debet patere, sed humilibus et abiectis: nam inlustres illi ac potentes nulla re possunt indigere, quos opulentia sua et munit et honorat. nihil autem a iusto uiro faciendum est nisi quod sit beneficum. beneficium autem si refertur, interit atque finitur: nec enim possumus id habere integrum cuius pretium nobis persolutum est. in iis itaque beneficiis iustitiae ratio uersatur quae salua et incorrupta permanserint, permanent autem non aliter quam si praestentur iis hominibus qui prodesse nullo modo possunt. at ille m recipiendis lnlustribus nihil spectauit aliut nisi utilitatem nec dissimulauit homo ingeniosus quid ex eo commodi speraret. ait enim, qui id faciat, potentem aput exteros futurum per gratiam principum, quos sibi hospitii et amicitiae iure constrinxerit. o quam multis argumentis (Ciceronis inconstantia, si id agerem, coargui posset! nec tam nostris quam suis uerbis refelleretur. idem quippe ait, ut quisque maxime ad suum commodum referat quaecumque agit, ita minime esse uirum bonum. idem etiam negat simplicis et aperti hominis esse ambire, simulare aliquid et praetendere, aliut agere uideri, cum aliut agat, praestare se alteri fingere quod sibi praestet, sed malitiosi potius et astuti et fallacis et subdoli. quomodo ergo defenderet quominus ambitiosa illa hospitalitas malitia esset? tu mihi per omnes portas circumcurses, ut aduenientes populorum atque urbium principes domum tuam inuites, ut per eos aput ciues eorum potentiam consequare, uelisque te iustum et humanum et hospitalem uideri, cum studeas utilitati tuae ? uerum hoc ille non potius incaute, — quid enim minus in Ciceronem conuenit? — sed ignorantia ueri iuris prudens ac sciens in hos se laqueos induit. quod ut ei possit ignosci, testificatus est non ad ueram iustitiam, quam non teneat, praecepta se dare, sed ad umbram imaginemque iustitiae. ignoscendum est igitur umbratico et imaginario praeceptori uec ab eo ueritas exigenda est qui se nescire fateatur. —
captiuorum redemptio magnum atque praeclarum iustitiae munus est, quod idem ipse Tullius adprobauit. atque haec benignitas inquit etiam rei publicae est utilis, redimi e seruitute captos, locupletari tenuiores. hanc ego consuetudinem benignitatis largitioni munerum longe antepono, haec est grauium hominum atque magnorum. proprium igitur iustorum opus est alere pauperes ac redimere captiuos, cum aput iniustos, si qui haec faciant, graues et magni appellentur: iis enim maxime laudis est bene facere quibus nemo sperauit esse facturos. nam qui bonum facit uel consanguineo uel proximo uel amico, aut nullam aut certe non magnam laudem meretur, quia facere debet sitque impius ac detestabilis, nisi fecerit id quod ab eo et natura ipsa et necessitudo exigit, et si facit, non tam gloriae adsequendae quam reprehensionis uitandae gratia facit. qui autem facit alieno et ignoto, is uero dignus est laude, quoniam ut faceret sola ductus est humanitate. ibi ergo iustitia est ubi ad bene faciendum necessitatis uinculum nullum est. hoc igitur officium benignitatis ne anteponere quidem largitioni munerum debuit: quod est conparantis et e duobus bonis id quod sit melius eligentis. illa enim largitio hominum patrimonia sua in munera abicientium inanis et leuis et ab omni iustitia remotissima est. itaque ne dici quidem munera oportet in quibus nemo accipit nisi qui accipere non meretur. non minus magnum iustitiae opus est pupillos et uiduas destitutos et auxilio indigentes tueri atque defendere: quod adeo uniuersis diuina lex illa praescribit, quandoquidem boni quique iudices ad officium suum iudicant pertinere ut iis naturali humanitate faueant ac prodesse nitantur. uerum haec opera proprie nostra sunt, qui legem, qui uerba ipsius dei praecipientis accepimus. nam illi sentiunt quidem natura esse iustum tueri eos qui tutela carent, sed cur ita sit non perspiciunt. deus enim, cuius perpetua clementia est, idcirco uiduas pupillosque defendi ac foueri iubet, ne quis respectu ac miseratione pignorum suorum retardetur quominus mortem pro iustitia fideque suscipiat, sed incunctanter ac fortiter subeat, cum sciat se caros suos deo relinquere nec iis umquam praesidium defuturum. aegros quoque quibus defuerit qui adsistat, curandos fouendosque suscipere summae humanitatis et magnae operationis est: quod qui fecerit, hic uiuam hostiam deo adquiret et quod alteri dederit ad tempus, ipse a deo accipiet in aeternum. ultimum illud et maximum pietatis officium est peregrinorum et pauperum sepultura: quod illi uirtutis iustitiaeque doctores prorsus non attigerunt. nec enim poterant id uidere qui utilitate omnia officia metiebantur. in ceteris enim quae supra dicta sunt quamuis uerum limitem non tenuerint, tamen quoniam commodi aliquid in iis deprehenderunt, quasi odore quodam ueritatis retenti propius aberrarunt, hoc autem, quia nihil uidere in eo commodi poterant, reliquerunt. quin etiam non defuerunt qui superuacaneam facerent sepulturam nihilque esse dicerent mali iacere inhumatum et abiectum. quorum inpiam sapientiam cum omne humanum genus respuit, tum diuinae uoces, quae id fieri iubent. uerum illi non audent dicere id non esse faciendum, sed si forte non fiat, nihil esse incommodi. itaque in ea re non tam praecipientium quam consolantium funguntur officio, ut si forte id sapienti euenerit, ne se ob hoc miserum putet. nos autem non quid sapienti ferendum sit dicimus, sed quid facere ipse debeat. itaque non quaerimus nunc utrumne tota sepeliendi ratio sit utilis necne, sed haec etiamsi sit inanis, ut illi existimant, tamen faciendum est uel ob hoc solum, quod aput homines bene et humane fieri uidetur; animus enim quaeritur et propositum ponderatur. non ergo patiemur figuram et figmentum dei feris ac uolucribus in praedam iacere, sed reddemus id terrae, unde ortum est, et quamuis in homine ignoto necessariorum munus inplebimus, in quorum locum, quia desunt, succedet humanitas, et ubicumque homo desiderabitur, ibi exigi officium nostrum putabimus. in quo autem magis iustitiae ratio consistit quam in eo, ut quod praestamus nostris per adfectum, praestemus alienis per humanitatem? quae est multo certior iustiorque, cum iam non homini praestatur, qui nihil sentit, sed deo soli, cui carissimum sacrificium est opus iustum. dicet aliquis fortasse: \'si haec omnia fecero, nihil habebo. quid enim? si magnus hominum numerus egebit algebit capietur morietur, ut haec facientem uel uno die patrimonio exui sit necesse, perdamne rem familiarem meo aut maiorum labore quaesitam, ut iam ipsi mihi aliena misericordia uiuendum sit?\' quid? tu tam pusillo animo paupertatem times, quam etiam uestri philosophi laudant nihilque hac tutius, nihil tranquillius esse testantur? hoc quod times sollicitudinum portus est. an ignoras quot periculis, quot casibus cum his malis opibus subiaceas? quae tecum bene agent, si sine tuo cruore transierint. tu uero praeda onustus incedis et spolia geris, quae inritent animos etiam tuorum. quid ergo dubitas bene collocare id quod tibi forsan eripiet aut unum latrocinium aut existens repente proscriptio aut hostilis aliqua direptio? quid uerere fluxum et fragile bonum facere sempiternum aut thesauros tuos custodi deo credere, ubi non furem praedonemque timeas, non rubiginem, non tyrannum? qui aput deum diues est, pauper esse numquam potest. si iustitiam tanti putas, sequere abiectis oneribus quae te premunt, libera te ipse conpedibus et catenis, ut expeditus ad deum curras. magni et excelsi animi est despicere et calcare mortalia. sed si hanc uirtutem non capis, ut diuitias tuas in aram dei conferas, ut fragilibus tibi conpares firmiora, liberabo te metu. omnia ista praecepta non tibi soli dantur, sed omni populo, qui mente coniunctus est et cohaeret sicut homo unus. si solus magnis operibus non sufficis, pro uirili parte operare usam, sic tamen ut quantum diuitiis inter ceteros, tantum opere praecellas. neque nunc suaderi tibi putes ut rem familiarem tuam minuas uel exhaurias, sed quae in superuacua fueras inpensurus, ad meliora conuertas. unde bestias emis, hinc captos redime, unde feras pascis, hinc pauperes ale, unde homines ad gladium comparas, hinc innocentes mortuos sepeli. quid prodest perditae nequitiae bestiarios facere locupletes et instruere ad flagitia? transfer ad magnum sacrificium male peritura, ut pro his ueris muneribus habeas a deo munus aeternum. magna est misericordiae merces, cui deus pollicetur peccata se omnia remissurum. si audieris inquit preces supplicis tui, et ego audiam tuas: si misertus laborantium fueris, et ego in tuo labore miserebor. si autem non respexeris nec adiuueris, et ego animum tuum contra te geram tuisque te legibus iudicabo.