Arnobius — Against the Nations 2.35
“But if souls,” they say, “are mortal and of mid quality, how can they become immortal out of mid qualities?” If we should say we do not know that and have only believed what we heard from one more powerful, where will our credulity seem to have slipped if we believed the omnipotent king that nothing is difficult, nothing hard, if what is impossible for us to do is for him possible and ready at the measure of obedience? For is there anything that can stand against his wills, or what he has willed does not necessarily follow that it comes to be? Or shall we gather from our divisions what can or cannot be done, and not consider that our reasonings are as mortal as we ourselves are and of no name before the prince?
And yet, you who do not believe souls are of mid quality and are held on the mid limit of life and destruction — are not all altogether whom opinion suspects to be gods, angels, demons, or by whatever other name, themselves also of mid quality and wavering in the condition of an ambiguous lot? For if we all concede there is one Father of things, alone immortal and unbegotten, and nothing at all is found before him that was of any name, it follows that all those opinion has believed to be gods of mortals were either generated by him or brought forth at his command. If they are brought forth and generated, they are also of later order and time; if of later order and time, they must have origins and beginnings of birth and life: but what has an entrance and a beginning of starting life necessarily must also have a setting.
Latin
35.1. ''Sed si animae, inquiunt, mortales et qualitatis sunt mediae, irmmortales quemadmodum fieri mediis ex qualitatibus possunt?''. - Si nos istud nescire dicamus ac tantummodo auditum ex potentiore credidisse, uhi nostra videbitur credulitas lapsa, si omnipotenti credidimus regi nihil esse difficile, nihil arduum, si quod inpossibile nobis est factu, illi possibile atque ad modum obsecutionis paratum? 2. Est enim quod obstare eius voluntatibus possit, aut quod esse voluerit, non necessario sequitur ut fiat? An numquid nostris ex divisionibus colligemus, quid aut fieri possit aut non possit, nec rationes considerabimus nostras tam esse mortales quam sumus nos ipsi et nullius apud principem nominis?
3. Et tamen, o isti, qui mediae qualitatis animas esse non creditis et in medio limite vitae atque interitus contineri, nonne omnes omnino, quos esse opinatio suspicatur, dii angeli daemones aut nomine quocumque sunt alio, qualitatis et ipsi sunt mediae et in ambiguae sortis condicione nutabiles? [Plat., Tim. 4] 4. Nam si omnes concedimus, unum esse rerum patrem, immortalem atque ingenitum solum, nihilque omnino ante illum quod alicuius vocaminis fuerit invenitur, sequitur ut hi omnes quos opinatio credidit deos esse mortalium aut ab eo sint geniti aut eo iubente prolati. Si sunt prolati et geniti, et ordinis sunt posterioris et temporis; si ordinis posterioris et temporis, ortus necesse est habeant et exordia nativitatis et vitae: quod autem habet introitum et vitae incipientis exordium, necessario sequitur ut habere debeat et occasum.