Man. Post. Cap. IV: PLAC — silentium minoris; syllogismus
Placeus. He is wise not to fight the major here. Besides three further Manuscript reasons he never answered, the first breach of the condition cannot be the penalty of some earlier sin—because it is the first sin—nor the penalty of itself, since nothing is later than itself. It would be absurd to attach to a precept a threat that the precept will be broken if it is broken. I had already confirmed the minor by an argument he preferred to bury in silence rather than face. Another proof: sin is law-breaking; privation of righteousness in a man is sin; therefore that privation is law-breaking. Clearer still? Yet he splits privation into active and passive—the man's self-stripping versus God's stripping—and admits only the first as law-breaking. So on his view the threatened law-penalty is the second, not the first. Look harder at that split. "Active" rightly names privation from the agent's side—the man who strips himself. Why then is "passive" not named from the patient's side—the man stripped? Privating answers to privated, agent to patient, action to passion; so active privation belongs to the one who strips, passive to the one stripped. How then is the "passive" assigned to God, who strips the man and is never himself stripped? That is the first point.
Latin
PLAC. Quod de majore litem hic non movet, prudenter facit: nam praeter tres illas rationes, quae sequuntur in Manuscripto, ad quas nihil respondit, violatio conditionis seu praecepti prima nec antecedentis peccati poena esse potest, cum sit peccatum primum, nec sui ipsius, cum non possit posterior esse seipsa: & ridicule apponeretur praecepto comminatio, quae minaretur fore ut violetur praeceptum, si violetur. Minorem argumento confirmaveram, quod illi visum est tutius silentio tegere, quam attingere. Potest etiam sic probari. Peccatum est violatio legis. Privatio justitiae in homine, est peccatum. Ergo privatio justitiae est violatio legis. Quid clarius? At ille distinguit privationem justitiae in activam & passivam: illam qua homo ipse male agendo justitia seipsum spoliat, hanc qua Deus hominem justitia privat: illam fatetur esse violationem legis, hanc negat. Ex quo sequitur, hanc, non illam, legem esse suo violatori comminatam. Consideremus igitur paulo attentius illam distinctionem. Recte sane privatio justitiae activa dicitur respectu privantis se justitia hominis: activa enim dicitur respectu agentis. Sed passiva, cur non similiter dicitur respectu privati seu patientis hominis? Nam ut privans respondet privato, agens patienti, actio passioni, ita videtur privatio active sumpta esse privantis, passive vero privati? Cur ergo passiva tribuitur Deo, qui privat hominem justitia, non privatur ullo modo? Hoc primum.