Not even empty deceit
Paul, then, saw that Greek philosophy holds persuasive arguments, not easy for most people to dismiss, which present falsehood as truth. Of these he says: “See to it that no one carries you off as spoil through philosophy and empty deceit, according to the tradition of men, according to the elements of the world, and not according to Christ” (Colossians 2:8). And seeing that a certain greatness shows itself in the words of the wisdom of the world (1 Corinthians 1:20), he said that the words of the philosophers were “according to the elements of the world.” But no one with any sense would say that Celsus’s writings too were written “according to the elements of the world.”
Those words of the philosophers, since they hold something deceptive, he also called “empty deceit” (Colossians 2:8), perhaps to distinguish it from a deceit that is not empty. Jeremiah perceived this other deceit and dared to say to God: “You deceived me, O Lord, and I was deceived; you were stronger, and you prevailed” (Jeremiah 20:7). But Celsus’s writings seem to me to hold no deceit at all, and therefore not even empty deceit, such as is found in the writings of those who founded schools in philosophy and who gained no ordinary understanding in those matters.
Just as no one would call any chance error in geometrical theorems a fallacious proof, or write it up as an exercise for training in such matters, so whatever is to be called, like those words of the philosophers, “empty deceit” and “the tradition of men, according to the elements of the world” (Colossians 2:8), must come close to the thoughts of those who founded schools in philosophy.
Greek
Ὁ μὲν οὖν Παῦλος συνιδὼν ὅτι ἔστιν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ Ἑλληνικῇ οὐκ εὐκαταφρόνητα τοῖς πολλοῖς πιθανὰ, παριστάντα τὸ ψεῦδος ὡς ἀλήθειαν, φησὶν ἐπ᾿ ἐκείνοις τό· „βλέπετε, μή τις ὑμᾶς ἔσται ὁ συλαγωγῶν διὰ τῆς φιλοσοφίας καὶ κενῆς ἀπάτης κατὰ τὴν παράδοσιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, κατὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου καὶ οὐ κατὰ Χριστόν.“ καὶ ὁρῶν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις τῆς τοῦ κόσμου σοφίας ἐμφαινόμενόν τι μέγεθος, εἶπεν εἶναι τοὺς λόγους τῶν φιλοσόφων „κατὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου.“ οὐδεὶς δὲ τῶν νοῦν ἐχόντων φήσαι ἂν καὶ τὰ Κέλσου „κατὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου“ εἶναι γεγραμμένα. κἀκεῖνα μὲν ἔχοντά τι ἀπατηλὸν καὶ κενὴν ἀπάτην ὠνόμασε, τάχα πρὸς ἀντιδιαστολὴν ἀπάτης τινὸς οὐ κενῆς. ἣν θεωρήσας ὁ Ἱερεμίας ἐτόλμησε πρὸς θεὸν εἰπεῖν τό· „ἠπάτησάς με, κύριε, καὶ ἠπατήθην, ἐκράτησας καὶ ἠδυνήθης·“ τὰ δὲ Κέλσου οὐδαμῶς ἀπάτην ἔχειν μοι φαίνεται, διὸ οὐδὲ κενὴν, ὁποίαν ἔχει τὰ τῶν αἱρέσεις ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ πηξάντων καὶ τῶν νοῦν οὐ τὸν τυχόντα κατ᾿ ἐκεῖνα ἀνειληφότων. καὶ ὥσπερ οὐ τὸ τυχὸν τῶν ψευδομένων ἐν γεωμετρικοῖς θεωρήμασι ψευδογραφούμενόν τις ἂν λέγοι ἢ καὶ ἀναγράφοι γυμνασίου ἕνεκεν τοῦ ἀπὸ τοιούτων, οὕτως παραπλήσια εἶναι χρὴ τοῖς τῶν αἱρέσεις πηξάντων ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ νοήμασι τὰ μέλλοντα ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις λέγεσθαι κενὴν ἀπάτην καὶ „παράδοσιν ἀνθρώπων, κατὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου.“