A speech that fits no Christian
If, then, such is the merit in writing speeches for characters and such the fault, who could not laugh at Celsus, and with good reason, when he puts into the mouths of Christians things that Christians do not say? For if he was making up the words of simple folk, how could such people distinguish sense from mind and the objects of sense from the objects of thought, and teach, like the Stoics who do away with intelligible realities, that whatever is grasped is grasped by the senses and that all grasping depends on the senses? But if he is making up the words of those who study philosophy and who examine carefully, as far as they are able, the things of Christ, he has not given them words that fit them either.
For no one who has learned that God is invisible, and that there are some invisible created things, that is, intelligible ones (Colossians 1:15–16), would say, as though in defence of the resurrection: “How will they know God if they do not grasp him by the senses?” or “What can be learned without sense?” And it is written, not in writings kept apart and read only by a few lovers of learning, but in the more commonly read ones, that “the invisible things of God, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood through the things that are made” (Romans 1:20). From this we may know that, even if people in this life must begin from the senses and the objects of sense when they are going to rise up to the nature of intelligible things, they must certainly not remain among the objects of sense. Nor will they say that it is impossible to learn intelligible things without sense; and if they do use the words “Who can learn without sense?”, they will show that Celsus had no good reason to add to them “the voice not of a man, nor of the soul, but of the flesh.”
Greek
Εἴπερ δὲ τοιαύτη μὲν ἡ ἐν τῷ προσωποποιεῖν ἀρετὴ τοιαδὶ δὲ ἡ κακία, πῶς οὐκ εὐλόγως τις καταγελάσεται Κέλσου, Χριστιανοῖς περιτιθέντος τὰ μὴ ὑπὸ Χριστιανῶν λεγόμενα; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἰδιωτῶν ἀνέπλασσε λόγους, πόθεν τοῖς τοιούτοις δύνασθαι διακρίνειν αἴσθησιν ἀπὸ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ αἰσθητὰ νοητῶν καὶ δογματίζειν παραπλησίως τοῖς ἀναιροῦσι νοητὰς οὐσίας Στωϊκοῖς περὶ τοῦ αἰσθήσεσιν καταλαμβάνεσθαι τὰ καταλαμβανόμενα καὶ πᾶσαν κατάληψιν ἠρτῆσθαι τῶν αἰσθήσεων; εἰ δ᾿ ἀναπλάσσει λόγους τῶν φιλοσοφούντων καὶ ἐπιμελῶς ὅση δύναμις ἐξεταζόντων τὰ Χριστοῦ. οὐδὲ τούτοις ἀκόλουθα πεποίηκεν. οὐδεὶς γὰρ μαθὼν ἀόρατον εἶναι τὸν θεὸν καὶ εἶναί τινα δημιουργήματα ἀόρατα. τουτέστι νοητὰ, λέγοι ἂν ὡς ἀπολογούμενος περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀνάστασιν τό· πῶς αἰσθήσεσι μὴ καταλαμβανόμενοι γνώσονται τὸν θεόν; ἤ· τί χωρὶς αἰσθήσεως μαθεῖν δυνατόν ἐστι; καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἀνακεχωρηκόσι καὶ ἀναγινωσκομένοις ὑπὸ ὀλίγων μόνον καὶ φιλομαθῶν ἀλλ᾿ ἐν τοῖς δημωδεστέροις γέγραπται ὅτι „τὰ ἀόρατα τοῦ θεοῦ ἀπὸ κτίσεως κόσμου τοῖς ποιήμασι νοούμενα καθορᾶται“· δι᾿ ὧν ἔστιν εἰδέναι ὅτι εἰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν βίῳ ἀνθρώπους χρὴ ἀπὸ αἰσθήσεων ἄρξασθαι καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, μέλλοντας ἀναβαίνειν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν νοητῶν φύσιν, ἀλλ᾿ οὔτι γε ἐν αἰσθητοῖς καταμένειν χρή· οὔτε χωρὶς αἰσθήσεως ἐροῦσιν ἀδύνατον εἶναι μαθεῖν τὰ νοητὰ, χρώμενοι δὲ τῷ τίς χωρὶς αἰσθήσεως μαθεῖν δυνατός ἐστιν; ἐλέγξουσιν οὐκ εὐλόγως τούτῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ Κέλσου ἐπιφέρεσθαι τὸ οὐκ ἀνθρώπου μὲν οὐδὲ ψυχῆς ἀλλὰ γὰρ σαρκὸς φωνή.