In what sense God is beyond word and name
Celsus says of God that “from him are all things”, though, I do not know how, he has cut all things loose from him. Our Paul, however, says, “From him and through him and to him are all things” (Romans 11:36), showing the beginning of the existence of all things in “from him”, their holding together in “through him”, and their end in “to him”. And in truth God is from no one.
But since he says, “Nor is he attainable by reason”, I distinguish the meaning and say this. If he means the reason within us, whether held within or spoken aloud, we too shall say that God is not attainable by reason. But if, having understood the words, “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God” (John 1:1), we declare that God is attainable by this Word, and is comprehended not by him alone but also by anyone to whom he reveals the Father (Matthew 11:27), then we shall prove false the saying of Celsus, who states: “Nor is God attainable by reason.”
His “not nameable”, too, needs a distinction. If it means that nothing in words and their meanings can present the properties of God, what is said is true, since many qualities too cannot be named. For who can express in names the difference in quality between the sweetness of a date and the sweetness of a dried fig? Who can distinguish by a name and present the proper quality of each? It is no wonder, then, if in this sense God cannot be named. But if you take “nameable” to mean that it is possible to present in names something of what concerns him, so as to lead the hearer by the hand and help him grasp some things about God, as far as human nature can attain, there is nothing absurd in calling him nameable.
In the same way we shall also distinguish the saying, “For he has experienced nothing that can be grasped by a name.” And it is true as well that God is “outside every passion”. So much for this.
Greek
Ὁ μὲν οὖν Κέλσος περὶ θεοῦ φησιν ὅτι ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὰ πάντα, ἀπολύσας οὐκ οἶδ᾿ ὅπως τὰ πάντα αὐτοῦ· ὁ δ᾿ ἡμέτερος Παῦλος „ἐξ αὐτοῦ“ λέγει „καὶ δι᾿ αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν τὰ πάντα,“ παριστὰς τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς τῶν πάντων ὑποστάσεως ἐν τῷ „ἐξ αὐτοῦ“ καὶ τὴν συνοχὴν ἐν τῷ „δι᾿ αὐτοῦ“ καὶ τὸ τέλος ἐν τῷ „εἰς αὐτόν.“ ἀληθῶς δὲ ἐξ οὐδενὸς ὁ θεός. ἐπεὶ δέ φησιν ὅτι οὐδὲ λόγῳ ἐφικτὸς, διαστέλλομαι τὸ σημαινόμενον καί φημι· εἰ μὲν λόγῳ τῷ ἐν ἡμῖν, εἴτε ἐνδιαθέτῳ εἴτε καὶ προφορικῷ, καὶ ἡμεῖς φήσομεν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐφικτὸς τῷ λόγῳ ὁ θεός· εἰ δὲ νοήσαντες τὸ „ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν, καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος“ ἀποφαινόμεθα ὅτι τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ἐφικτός ἐστιν ὁ θεὸς, οὐ μόνῳ αὐτῷ καταλαμβανόμενος ἀλλὰ καὶ ᾧ ἂν αὐτὸς ἀποκαλύψῃ τὸν πατέρα, ψευδοποιήσομεν τὴν Κέλσου λέξιν φάσκοντος· οὐδὲ λόγῳ ἐφικτός ἐστιν ὁ θεός. καὶ τὸ οὐκ ὀνομαστὸς δὲ διαστολῆς δεῖται. εἰ μὲν γὰρ, ὅτι οὐδὲν τῶν ἐν λέξεσι καὶ σημαινομένοις δύναται παραστῆσαι τὰς ἰδιότητας τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ λεγόμενον, εἴ γε καὶ πολλαὶ ποιότητες οὐκ εἰσὶν ὀνομασταί. τίς γὰρ δύναται ὀνόμασι διαφορὰν δοῦναι ποιότητος γλυκύτητος φοίνικος καὶ γλυκύτητος ἰσχάδος; τίς δὲ ὀνόματι δύναται διαστείλασθαι καὶ παραστῆσαι τὴν ἑκάστου ἰδίαν ποιότητα; οὐδὲν οὖν θαυμαστὸν, εἰ οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως ὀνομαστὸς ὁ θεός. εἰ δὲ τὸ ὀνομαστὸν λαμβάνεις καθὸ οἷόν τε ἐστὶν ὀνόμασι παραστῆσαί τι τῶν περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ χειραγωγῆσαι τὸν ἀκροατὴν καὶ ποιῆσαι νοῆσαι περὶ θεοῦ κατὰ τὸ ἐφικτὸν τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει τινὰ τῶν περὶ αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον λέγειν αὐτὸν ὀνομαστόν. οὕτω δὲ διαστελούμεθα καὶ τὸ οὐδὲν γὰρ πέπονθεν ὀνόματι καταληπτόν. ἀληθὲς δὲ καὶ τὸ ἔξω παντὸς πάθους εἶναι τὸν θεόν. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ταύτῃ.