God wills nothing unworthy of himself
Having once said that God wills nothing that is unbefitting to himself, since such a thing would destroy his very being as God, we will say that if a man in his own depravity wills something vile, God will not be able to do it. So we are not bent on quarrelling with what Celsus says; rather, examining his words out of love for the truth, we will agree that God is not the God “of faulty appetite, nor of wandering disorder, but of right and just nature,” since he is the author of all that is good. And we confess another thing: that he can “grant everlasting life to a soul”; and not only can he, but he does grant it.
Because of what we have said already, nothing at all troubles us, not even the saying of Heraclitus which Celsus has taken over, that “corpses are more fit to be thrown out than dung” (Heraclitus, fragment 96). And yet one might say about this too that dung is indeed fit to be thrown out, but the corpses of human beings are not, because of the soul that dwelt in them, especially if that soul was a finer one. For under the more civilised of laws they are thought worthy of burial, with such honour as is possible for such things, so that we may not, in effect, insult the soul that dwelt within by casting away the body after the soul has left it, as we do the bodies of cattle.
Let it be granted, then, that God does not will “to make everlasting against reason” the grain of wheat, but rather the ear that comes from it; nor what is sown “in corruption,” but what is raised from it “in incorruption” (1 Corinthians 15:42). Further, the reason of all things is, according to Celsus, God himself; but according to us it is his Son, the Word, about whom we say in our philosophy: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God” (John 1:1). And according to us too, God “can do nothing contrary to reason, nor contrary to himself.”
Greek
Ἅπαξ δ᾿ εἰπόντες ὅτι οὐδὲν μὴ πρέπον ἑαυτῷ ὁ θεὸς βούλεται, ἀναιρετικὸν τυγχάνον τοῦ εἶναι αὐτὸν θεὸν, φήσομεν ὅτι, ἐάν τι κατὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν ἑαυτοῦ ἄνθρωπος βδελυρὸν βούληται, τοῦτο οὐ δυνήσεται ὁ θεός. οὕτω δὲ οὐκ ἐσμὲν φιλόνεικοι πρὸς τὰ ὑπὸ Κέλσου λεγόμενα, ἀλλὰ φιλαλήθως αὐτὰ ἐξετάζοντες συμφήσομεν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τῆς πλημμελοῦς ὀρέξεως οὐδὲ τῆς πεπλανημένης ἀκοσμίας ἀλλὰ τῆς ὀρθῆς καὶ δικαίας φύσεως ὁ θεὸς, ἅτε ἀρχηγέτης τυγχάνων παντὸς καλοῦ· καὶ ἄλλο ὅτι ψυχῆς αἰώνιον βιοτὴν δύναται παρασχεῖν ὁμολογοῦμεν, καὶ οὐ μόνον δύναται ἀλλὰ καὶ παρέχει. οὐδὲν δὲ μάλιστα διὰ τὰ προειρημένα λυπεῖ ἡμᾶς οὐδὲ τὸ ὑπὸ Ἡρακλείτου λεγόμενον, ὅπερ Κέλσος παρείληφεν, ὅτι „νέκυές εἰσι κοπρίων ἐκβλητότεροι“· καίτοι γε εἴποι τις ἂν καὶ περὶ τούτου ὅτι τὰ μὲν κόπρια ἐκβλητά ἐστιν, οἱ δ᾿ ἐξ ἀνθρώπου νέκυες διὰ τὴν ἐνοικήσασαν ψυχὴν, καὶ μάλιστα ἐὰν ᾖ ἀστειοτέρα, οὐκ ἐκβλητοί. κατὰ γὰρ τοὺς ἀστειοτέρους τῶν νόμων μετὰ τῆς ἐνδεχομένης ὡς πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα τιμῆς ταφῆς ἀξιοῦνται· ἵνα μὴ ὑβρίζωμεν τῇ δυνάμει τὴν ἐνοικήσασαν ψυχὴν, ἀποῤῥιπτοῦντες μετὰ τὸ ἐξελθεῖν ἐκείνην τὸ σῶμα ὡς καὶ τὰ τῶν κτηνῶν σώματα. μὴ βουλέσθω οὖν ὁ θεὸς παραλόγως αἰώνιον ἀποφῆναι μήτε τὸν τοῦ „σίτου“ „κόκκον“ ἀλλ᾿ ἢ ἄρα τὸν ἐξ αὐτοῦ στάχυν, μηδὲ τὸ σπειρόμενον „ἐν φθορᾷ“ ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀπ᾿ αὐτοῦ ἐγειρόμενον „ἐν ἀφθαρσίᾳ.“ ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ τῶν πάντων λόγος ἐστὶ κατὰ μὲν Κέλσον αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς, κατὰ δὲ ἡμᾶς ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ· περὶ οὗ φιλοσοφοῦντες λέγομεν τό· „ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν, καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος.“ ἀλλὰ καὶ καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν οἷός τε παράλογον οὐδὲ παρ᾿ ἑαυτὸν ἐργάσασθαί ἐστιν ὁ θεός.