Against Celsus, Book IV · §84 · Origen of Alexandria

Do ants hold conversations?

Since he also says that the living “set apart a special place for the ants that die, and this serves them as ancestral tombs,” we must reply that the more he speaks in praise of irrational animals, the more, even against his will, he magnifies the work of the Word who set all things in order, and shows the skill that is in men, which can adorn in words even the advantages that irrational creatures have by nature.

But why do I say “irrational”? For Celsus thinks that the creatures which, by the common notions of all men, are called irrational are not irrational at all. At any rate he does not think even ants are irrational, this man who promised to speak about the whole of nature and boasted of truth in the title of his book. For he speaks of ants as conversing with one another, in these words: “And indeed, when they meet one another they converse, and that is why they do not lose their way. So there is among them a full measure of reason, common notions of certain universals, utterance, objects and meanings.”

For one person’s conversing with another takes place in an utterance that makes known some meaning, and often reports about what are called objects. To say that these exist among ants as well, how could that not be the most ridiculous thing of all?

Greek

Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἀποθνῄσκουσιν μύρμηξί φησι τοὺς ζῶντας ἴδιόν τι ἀποκρίνειν χωρίον. κἀκεῖνο αὐτοῖς εἶναι πάτρια μνήματα, λεκτέον ὅτι ὅσῳ πλείονα λέγει τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων ἐγκώμια, τοσούτῳ πλεῖον. κἂν μὴ θέλῃ, αὔξει τὸ τοῦ πάντα κοσμήσαντος λόγου ἔργον καὶ δείκνυσι τὴν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἐντρέχειαν, δυναμένην κοσμεῖν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὰ πλεονεκτήματα τῆς φύσεως τῶν ἀλόγων. (τί δὲ λέγω τῶν ἀλόγων.) ἐπεὶ Κέλσῳ δοκεῖ μηδ᾿ ἄλογα εἶναι τὰ κατὰ τὰς κοινὰς πάντων ἐννοίας ἄλογα καλούμενα; οὐδὲ τοὺς μύρμηκας γοῦν οἴεται εἶναι ἀλόγους ὁ περὶ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως ἐπαγγειλάμενος λέγειν καὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν τῇ ἐπιγραφῇ τοῦ βιβλίου αὐχήσας. φησὶ γὰρ περὶ τῶν μυρμήκων ὡς διαλεγομένων ἀλλήλοις τοιαῦτα· καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ ἀπαντῶντες ἀλλήλοις διαλέγονται, ὅθεν οὐδὲ τῶν ὁδῶν ἁμαρτάνουσιν· οὐκοῦν καὶ λόγου συμπλήρωσίς ἐστι παρ᾿ αὐτοῖς καὶ κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι καθολικῶν τινων καὶ φωνὴ καὶ τυγχάνοντα καὶ σημαινόμενα. τὸ γὰρ διαλέγεσθαί τινα πρὸς ἕτερον ἐν φωνῇ γίνεται δηλούσῃ τι σημαινόμενον. πολλάκις δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν καλουμένων τυγχανόντων ἀπαγγελλούσῃ· ἅπερ καὶ ἐν μύρμηξι λέγειν εἶναι πῶς οὐ πάντων ἂν εἴη καταγελαστότατον;

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About this text

Origen answers Celsus’s scorn for the belief that God or his Son comes down to the world, showing that the Word comes down without change and that God’s threats and punishments are a cure, not a fit of temper. He then defends the stories of Genesis and the patriarchs, read in their deeper sense, against the charge that they are silly tales, and rejects Celsus’s claim that the world was made no more for man than for the animals, which Celsus thought nearer to God than men.

Translated from the Greek of Koetschau, GCS 2–3 (1899), via the Perseus digital text, which serves as the base text. Each chapter was translated from the Greek and then checked clause by clause against it in a separate review. No earlier English translation was consulted.

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Translated from Koetschau GCS 2 – 3 (1899) — Greek (Greek · Book IV, chapters 1 – 99)

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