Ames' reconciliation: the power not to act remains
Thesis LVIII. Not all of them, however, show in the same way how these things fit together. Amesius, just cited, following Didacus Alvarez, tries to reconcile that direct and effective working and determining of God's grace in the will with the will's own freedom in acting and in obeying grace.
He says that someone acts freely if, while acting, he keeps the power not to act. Grace moves and determines the will to act, yet it does not take away its power not to act. The power not to act exists in the same subject together with the grace and help needed for acting, the help that makes someone act.
Yet the grace and help given for a particular action and the absence of that action never are, and never can be, in the same subject at once. Others say the same thing this way: grace does determine the act, but it does not remove all indifference and indetermination from the faculty.
Latin
LVIII. Quomodo vero ista inter se constent, non eadem ratione omnes ostendere conantur. Et quidem modo citatus Amesius sic post Didacum Alvarés conciliare nititur immediatam illam & efficacem gratiae divinae in voluntatem operationem & determinationem, cum voluntatis ipsius libertate in agendo, & gratiae obsequendo. Nempe libere operari dicit illum qui dum agit retinet potestatem non agendi. Jam vero gratiam, quamvis voluntatem moveat & determinet ad agendum, ab ea tamen non tollere non agendi potestatem. Quippe potentiam ad non operandum simul consistere in eodem subjecto cum gratia & auxilio quod requiritur ad operandum, & efficit ut aliquis operetur: licet simul nunquam sint nec esse possint in eodem subjecto gratia & auxilium ad talem operationem particularem datum, & carentia talis actus. Quod alii dicunt gratiam actum quidem determinare, sed tamen a facultate non tollere omnem indifferentiam & indeterminationem.