Bellarmine: equal inward motion, unequal grace
Thesis CXXXII. This is Bellarmine's teaching, comparing his own view with that of Molina and Lessius, though without naming them. 'The first view,' he says, 'makes the efficacy of grace depend on the human will; ours makes it depend on the will of God. Suppose the question is put: if two people have entirely the same exciting and assisting grace, at least in first act, hear the same preacher and see the same signs, can it happen that one believes and the other does not? The first view will answer that it can, since the will remains free and can follow grace or resist it at its own choice.
Our view will answer that it can indeed happen that two people receive the same inward motion, hear the same preacher, see the same signs, and that one believes while the other does not. But it cannot happen that two people receive entirely the same exciting grace and one believes while the other does not. Grace includes not only the inward motion or stirring but also the circumstances of place, time, person and so on. If the same motion is received and one believes while the other does not, then beyond doubt the one received it in the manner, place and time that God foresaw would suit his temperament, and the other did not; and so the believer had a far greater grace of God than the unbeliever.
The one who did not believe had grace by which he could believe if he would; the one who believed had grace by which he could and would believe. For God works the willing in us when he calls people in such a way as he sees they will follow. So the believer truly has no ground to boast or swell with pride over the unbeliever, since what chiefly sets him apart from the unbeliever is not he himself by free choice but God by the efficacious grace he gave him and did not give the other' (On grace and free choice, book 1, chapter 13, near the end).
Latin
CXXXII. Sic docet Bellarminus, sententiam suam cum sententia Molinae & Lessii comparans, iis tamen non nominatis. Prima, inquit, opinio vult efficaciam gratiae pendere a voluntate humana, nostra vero pendere vult a voluntate Dei. Et, si proponatur quaestio, utrum si duo homines habeant eandem omnino gratiam excitantem & adjuvantem, saltem in actu primo, & eundem concionatorem audiant, & eadem signa videant: utrum, inquam, fieri possit, ut unus credat, alter non credat? Prima illa opinio respondebit, fieri posse: quia libera voluntas manet, & potest pro arbitrio gratiam sequi, vel ei resistere. At nostra sententia respondebit, posse quidem fieri, ut duo homines, eadem interna motione accepta, eundem concionatorem audiant, & eadem signa videant, & unus credat, alter non credat; tamen non posse fieri, ut si eandem omnino gratiam excitantem duo homines accipiant; unus credat, alter non credat. Siquidem ad gratiam non solum pertinet motio, sive excitatio interna, sed circumstantia loci, temporis, personae, &c. Si enim eadem motione accepta, unus credit, alter non credit, sine dubio unus accepit motionem eo modo, loco & tempore, quo Deus praevidit ejus ingenio congruere, alter non ita accepit; ac per hoc longe majorem habuit Dei gratiam, is qui credit, quam qui non credit. Qui enim non credidit, habuit gratiam qua posset si vellet credere; qui autem credidit, habuit gratiam qua posset & vellet credere. Tunc enim Deus in nobis operatur velle, quum ita vocat, ut videt secuturos. Et ideo vere non potest fidelis adversus infidelem gloriari, aut inflari: quia qui eum principaliter discernit ab infideli, non est ipse per liberum arbitrium, sed Deus per gratiam efficacem, quam ei dedit, alteri non dedit. De gratia & libero arbitrio lib. 1. c. 13. sub finem.