Jansenius: delight is not of the will's nature, nor preceded the first sin
Thesis CXV. Jansenius, by contrast, does not hold that the love and desire he calls delight necessarily precede every act of the will, when the will is considered absolutely and apart from the weakness contracted through sin. This is the delight by which the will is now drawn before it freely wills and embraces anything, and by which above all it must be touched before it pursues the heavenly and spiritual good.
On his doctrine it is not simply part of the will's nature that it cannot freely embrace a good object unless the object has first delighted it. Still less does it belong to the will's nature to be touched by some delight whenever a good and pleasant object is presented to it. Above all, he teaches that the first sin, of men and of angels alike, was committed without any preceding delight, and that neither men nor angels in their unfallen state had any affection by which they were solicited and invited to the will's first evil act.
Latin
CXV. Jansenius autem illum amorem & desiderium, quod delectationis nomine significat, & quo voluntas jam trahitur, priusquam quicquam libere velit & amplectatur, ac quo praesertim illam affici necesse est, antequam prosequatur bonum coeleste & spirituale, necessario praecedere non censet omnes voluntatis actus, si consideretur absolute, & citra infirmitatem per peccatum contractam. Etenim secundum illius doctrinam, non est simpliciter de natura voluntatis, ut non valeat libere bonum objectum amplecti, nisi prius delectaverit: ac multo minus ad naturam voluntatis pertinet, ut si objectum bonum & jucundum ipsi offeratur, tangatur aliqua delectatione. Praesertim vero docet peccatum primum sive hominum, sive Angelorum, sine delectatione praecedenti perpetratum esse: nec ullum fuisse vel in hominibus, vel in angelis integris affectum, quo ad primum malum voluntatis actum sollicitati & invitati sint.