Able not to be converted: composite and divided sense
Thesis XCII. It follows from his assumptions that, whatever aids of prevenient grace are given, taken as prevenient, a person is able not to be converted, in the composite sense as well as in the divided sense. Given the aid of the same grace as cooperating, however, a person can indeed fail to be converted in the divided sense, but not in the composite sense.
For the influence of cooperating grace cannot be present, as cooperating in conversion, without the sinner being converted through his own choice. This takes nothing away from the freedom of choice, because, as has been said many times already, that influence of cooperating grace depends on the consent of human choice. This can be seen in the same disputation, in the paragraph beginning 'Hinc patet'.
Latin
XCII. Inde vero sequitur, juxta illius hypotheses, positis quibusvis auxiliis gratiae praevenientis, qua praeveniens est, hominem posse non converti, tam in sensu composito, quam in sensu diviso. At posito ejusdem gratiae auxilio, quatenus est cooperans, hominem posse quidem non converti in sensu diviso; Verum id falsum esse in sensu composito; quia fieri non potest, ut adsit influxus gratiae cooperantis, quatenus est cooperans conversionem, quin peccator per suum arbitrium convertatur; quod tamen arbitrii libertati nihil officit: quia influxus iste gratiae cooperantis, ab arbitrii humani consensu, ut saepe jam dictum est, pendet. Ut videre est in eadem disputatione paragr. hinc patet.