Molina's two anathemas
Thesis LXXXVII. From this he concludes that the consent of free choice to God, who rouses and calls through prevenient grace, is nothing in reality that is not supernatural and does not at the same time come from God, not only as from one who allures, rouses and invites choice to it, but also as from one who cooperates through the aid of grace. On his view, therefore, 'anyone who affirms that the consent of our choice to God, who rouses and calls through the aid of prevenient grace, is a natural act, or can be elicited without the aid and cooperation of that prevenient grace, must be held anathema.'
Yet he declares in turn that 'anyone is also anathema who says that this consent is not in the free power of our choice in the way he has explained', namely so that it lies with free choice to make such prevenient grace of the Holy Spirit void or not. These are his words in the same disputation 40.
Latin
LXXXVII. Unde fieri pertendit, Ut consensus liberi arbitrii Deo excitanti & vocanti per gratiam praevenientem, nihil in re sit quod non sit supernaturale, & quod non simul a Deo emanet, non solum tanquam ab alliciente, excitante & invitante ad id arbitrium, sed etiam tanquam a cooperante per auxilium gratiae. Ac proinde, ex ipsius sententia, Anathema censeri debet, qui affirmaverit consensum arbitrii nostri Deo excitanti & vocanti per auxilium gratiae praevenientis esse actum naturalem, aut posse elici sine auxilio & cooperatione ejusdem praevenientis gratiae. Quanquam iterum pronunciet esse etiam Anathema, qui dixerit eundem consensum non esse in libera arbitrii nostri ad modum ab ipso explicatum potestate: ita scilicet, ut sit penes liberum arbitrium, reddere cassam aut non reddere ejusmodi praevenientem spiritus sancti gratiam: quae sunt verba ejus in eadem quadragesima disputatione.