Yet the consent is supernatural: grace cooperates as a habit with its power
Thesis LXXXV. Even so, he holds that the act of free choice by which it consents to divine grace is not merely natural but supernatural, and must be ascribed to God's grace. This is so not only insofar as grace is called prevenient, alluring and inviting a person to the good and in a way supplying him with new strength, but also insofar as through that same grace God, together with man's free choice, flows into its act; in this respect it is called cooperating grace.
On his view, the grace by which God anticipates a person helps the will in acting and cooperates with it in the way a habit inhering in a power concurs with that power toward its act. So this cooperation of grace itself depends on the free will, and must not be thought of as moving the will or as prior to its action. In the same way, a habit's influence on an act depends on the power: the habit does not move the power to act, but, as the power moves itself to act, the habit flows together with it into the power's act.
Latin
LXXXV. Nihilominus vult actum liberi arbitrii quo gratiae divinae consentit, non esse mere naturalem, sed supernaturalem; & gratiae Dei tribui debere; Idque non solum quatenus dicitur praeveniens, & hominem allicit & invitat ad bonum, eique quodammodo novas vires sufficit: sed etiam quatenus per eandem gratiam, Deus cum libero hominis arbitrio in actum illius influit, quo respectu dicitur gratia coadjuvans. Nempe, ex ipsius mente, gratia illa Dei qua Deus hominem praevenit, voluntatem in agendo juvat, & cum ea cooperatur, qua ratione habitus potentiae inhaerens, cum illa ad actum ipsius concurrit. Ac proinde illa ipsa gratiae cooperatio a libera voluntate pendet, nec concipi debet ut voluntatem movens & ejus actione prior: quemadmodum influxus habitus in actum aliquem a potentia pendet, nec potentiam ad operandum movet, sed potentia se ad agendum movente simul cum ea in actum potentiae influit.