Before the fall no delight ruled the will; the first sin had no delight before it
Thesis LXVIII. So he ascribes all this to a weakness of the will contracted through sin, which is to be counted among the punishments of sin. On his assumptions, before sin no delight ruled the will, bending and determining it to one side or the other by effectively drawing out its consent.
Before man fell from his original integrity through sin, no delight in earthly things urged and enticed his will toward evil, since every such delight is born of concupiscence, which is the fruit of sin. The first sin of the first man was therefore committed with no delight going before it: the first delight followed the perverse will, not the will the delight. For every resistance to a good will is the punishment of an evil will, and God does not inflict it on a rational creature that has not deserved it.
Latin
LXVIII. Itaque totum istud tribuit imbecillitati cuidam voluntatis per peccatum contractae, & quae inter peccati poenas numeranda est. Nec enim ante peccatum, juxta illius hypotheses, delectatio ulla voluntati dominabatur, & in alterutram partem illam flectebat ac determinabat, efficaciter ejus consensum eliciendo. Nam priusquam homo per peccatum integritate sua primaeva cecidisset, nulla terrenarum rerum delectatio voluntatem ejus ad malum sollicitabat & illiciebat; idque quoniam omnis ejusmodi delectatio nascitur ex concupiscentia, quae peccati fructus est. Ac proinde primum peccatum primi hominis sine delectatione praecedente perpetratum est. Delectatio quippe prima secuta est perversam voluntatem, non voluntas delectationem. Siquidem omnis repugnantia bonae voluntatis supplicium est malae; quod Deus creaturae rationali non infligit immeritae.