Jansenius's preferred concord: freedom as acting from one's own reason
Thesis XLV. Jansenius and those who share his view do acknowledge that the efficacy of divine grace must be reconciled in this way with indifference, that is, with the power toward good and evil, toward acting and not acting, which they do not deny is found in all who live in this mortal body, and in which many seem to place the very essence of freedom. Even so, they insist that the true and genuine harmony of divine grace with free will is not to be sought there, because Augustine and his first disciples set out that harmony differently.
To reconcile grace with free choice, they say simply that grace does not take away free choice, since it causes free choice not to lie idle like a stone and do nothing, nor to be forced to the good against its will, but itself to will and act. For they defined as free what is in our power, and they said that what is in our power is what happens when we will it, or what someone does if he wills and does not do if he does not will. On these premises it follows that every act of will whatever, that is, every rational volition, is free. Just as it is impossible for it not to happen when we will it and to happen when we do not, so it is impossible for it not to be in our power and thereby not free.
Since grace, then, does nothing but cause us to elicit a good volition from the right judgment of reason, by that very fact it causes us to act freely, and so it does not destroy our freedom but establishes it. Jansenius judges this way of reconciling human freedom with the infallible efficacy of divine grace to be the best and most genuine of all (De gratia Christi Salvatoris, book 8, chapter 19). For on his view the essence of freedom considered in general does not consist at all in the indifference by which one can will or not will, will this or its contrary, but rather in being moved to will and act not by some external force or brute necessity but by the judgment of one's own reason, and so far being master of one's own act.
Latin
XLV. Quanquam vero Jansenius, & qui sunt in eadem cum ipso sententia, agnoscant cum gratiae divinae efficacia sic esse conciliandam indifferentiam, seu potestatem illam, ad bonum & ad malum, ad agendum & non agendum, quam non negant in iis omnibus reperiri qui degunt in hoc mortali corpore; & in qua multi ipsam libertatis essentiam constituere videntur: nihilominus pertendunt inde petendam non esse veram genuinamque divinae gratiae cum libera voluntate concordiam. Quoniam Augustinus & primi ejus discipuli concordiam istam aliter instituunt. Nimirum ut gratiam cum libero arbitrio concilient, simpliciter dicunt, eam idcirco non tollere liberum arbitrium, quia facit ut liberum arbitrium non instar lapidis otiosum sit & nihil agat, nec ut invitum cogatur ad bonum, sed ut etiam ipsum velit & agat, liberum enim definiebant quod est in nostra potestate: hoc autem in nostra esse potestate dicebant quod fit quando volumus, seu quod aliquis si vult facit, si non vult non facit. Quibus positis sequitur omnem omnino voluntatem, seu volitionem rationalem liberam esse: quia quemadmodum impossibile est, ut non fiat quando volumus, & fiat quando nolumus, ita consequenter impossibile est, ut non sit in nostra potestate, & hoc ipso libera non sit. Ac proinde cum gratia non aliud praestet quam ut volitionem bonam, ex rationis recto judicio, eliciamus, hoc ipso facit ut libere agamus, nec libertatem nostram destruit sed astruit. Quam rationem conciliandi libertatem humanam cum infallibili gratiae divinae efficacia, omnium optimam & maxime genuinam existimat esse Jansenius de Gratia Christi Salvatoris lib. 8. cap. 19. Idque quoniam, juxta ipsum, essentia libertatis in genere consideratae, minime consistit in indifferentia, qua potest aliquis velle vel non velle, istud velle, vel contrarium: sed in eo potius quod aliquis ad volendum & agendum, non aliqua vi externa, nec bruta necessitate, sed propriae rationis judicio movetur, & eatenus est actus sui Dominus.