Bellarmine's question answered by a distinction
Thesis XLIV. To the question Bellarmine poses, then, whether man in the state of fallen nature has free choice in choosing moral good and avoiding evil, or, which is the same thing, in keeping or breaking the moral precepts, they answer with a distinction. In that state, before grace, man has free choice in violating and breaking the moral precepts. Once grace is given, he can use the freedom of his choice both to keep them and to break them.
Without grace, however, he does not have free choice to keep those precepts. Without grace he can do nothing good, not through the lack of some physical faculty, for he always has a mind and a will, which are never stripped of their essential freedom, and no other natural faculty is needed for doing good. The reason is that his will is set fast in evil until God frees it by grace and releases it from the bondage of sin, a bondage that can coexist with the freedom just described.
Latin
XLIV. Ad quaestionem ergo a Bellarmino propositam, sit ne homo in statu naturae lapsae liberi arbitrii in bono morali eligendo & malo evitando, sive, quod idem est, in praeceptis morum observandis, aut praevaricandis? Respondent per distinctionem, videlicet, in eo statu hominem ante gratiam liberi arbitrii esse in praeceptis morum violandis atque praevaricandis. Posita vero gratia, illum arbitrii sui libertate uti posse tam ad praecepta morum observanda, quam ad illa transgredienda. Sine gratia autem illum non esse arbitrii liberi ad eadem praecepta servanda; quoniam absente gratia in bono nihil potest, non ex defectu Physicae alicujus facultatis; semper enim praeditus est mente & voluntate, quae essentiali quadam libertate nunquam spoliantur, & praeter quas nulla naturalis facultas requiritur ad bonum faciendum: sed quia voluntas ejus in malo obfirmata est, donec per gratiam a Deo liberetur, & exolvatur servitute peccati, quae cum priori illa libertate consistere potest.