A good end that is not God himself is not enough
Thesis XVI. Nor can anyone say that acts done for some end that is not bad are in some way referred to God's glory even if the agent does not think of it. Suppose, for example, that someone who does not know the true God gives money to a person in need in order to help him. It would be argued that such an act looks to God's glory, since all the goodness in created things looks to God of itself and is referred to him.
But for an act to be counted as done for God's glory, it is not enough that its end is something naturally good, which by its nature could be referred to God. Otherwise a man who works for no other end than to get rich could be said to work for God's glory, since wealth is in itself a good thing and not a bad one. Yet such work is undoubtedly wicked, and tends toward vice, not virtue.
Latin
XVI. Neque est quod quis dicat ad Dei gloriam quodammodo referri actiones quae fiunt ob finem aliquem non malum, etiamsi agens de eo non cogitet. Exempli causa, quum aliquis verum Deum non cognoscens pecuniam egenti largitur, ut ei subveniat, ejusmodi actionem ad Dei gloriam spectare: quoniam omnis quae est in rebus creatis bonitas ad Deum per se spectat atque refertur. Nec enim ut actio in Dei gloriam fieri censenda sit, sufficit ut finis ejus res sit naturaliter bona, & proinde quae ex sua natura ad Deum referri queat. Alioqui qui laborat non alium ob finem, quam ut opes acquirat, posset dici in Dei gloriam laborare, siquidem opes per se res bona, non mala sunt. Et tamen labor ejusmodi proculdubio labor improbus est, & ad vitium non ad virtutem spectat.