That natural help consists in a good thought God sends us
Although on his view this help belongs to the natural order, he affirms that it is distinct from the gift of creation and from the common influence by which God concurs with all natural causes. He places it chiefly in a holy thought by which, he holds, God must go before us for each good work. He proves that grace is needed for each good work from the thought prepared for us beforehand for each one.
'Although we have free choice,' he says, 'and our will moves freely either way, it cannot be moved at all without a thought, and something outside it must bring it to this first thought rather than the opposite one. So whenever it is stirred to good by a thought, when it might not have been, it receives from God a particular grace distinct from the grace and gift of creation.
Since God was free not to bring us to this or that good thought, he does us a particular kindness in it, whether he applies it directly himself or through other outside causes. However it happens, it must finally be traced to God, because divine providence and foreknowledge so order all the causes that stir this thought that contrary causes could have been ordered, or these arranged otherwise.' So he traces to this good thought, prepared for us by God's free will, the particular grace of God by which we do all good works, moral ones included.
Latin
XXIV. Quanquam autem istud auxilium juxta ipsum sit ordinis naturalis, affirmat tamen illud distinctum esse a dono creationis, & communi influxu, quo Deus cum omnibus causis naturalibus concurrit. Illud vero praecipue constituit in sancta quadam cogitatione, qua nos a Deo praeveniri ad singula bona opera necessarium existimat. Nam necessitatem gratiae ad singula bona opera probat ex praeparatione cogitationis, qua praevenimur per opera singula. Nam, inquit, quamvis simus liberi arbitrii, & voluntas nostra libere feratur in utramque partem; tamen quia sine cogitatione moveri nulla ratione potest, & ab extrinseco principio ad hanc primam cogitationem, potius quam ad oppositam applicari debet; efficitur ut quoties cogitatione ad bonum excitatur, cum posset non excitari, gratiam peculiarem a Deo recipiat distinctam a gratia & dono creationis. Quoniam cum liberum esset Deo non admovere nos ad hanc & illam boni cogitationem, peculiare in hoc nobis beneficium confert: sive haec applicatio fit proxime ab ipso Deo, sive per causas alias extrinsecas. Nam quocunque modo fiat, tandem ad Deum referenda est: eo quod omnes causae ad hanc cogitationem excitandam ita ordinatae sunt divina providentia, & praescientia, ut contrariae possent ordinari, vel ipsae aliter disponi. Itaque ad hanc cogitationem boni, liberali Dei voluntate nobis praeparatam, reducit peculiarem gratiam Dei, qua omnia opera bona etiam moralia efficimus.