Two senses of moral good
On the necessity of grace and the strength of free choice in human nature corrupted by sin, with respect to moral good, opinions in the Roman School vary widely. To understand this variety we must note that the Schools use 'moral good' sometimes in a wider and sometimes in a stricter sense.
In the wider sense, moral good is everything that depends on will and reason and shapes them both in such a way that a man is owed praise or reward for it and can be called good without qualification. So that good lies entirely in virtue and in acts done according to virtue, whether the virtue is acquired or infused, natural or supernatural.
Latin
THESIS I. DE necessitate gratiae, & de viribus liberi arbitrii, in natura hominis per peccatum corrupta, circa bonum morale, magna est in Schola Romana sententiarum varietas. Ad cujus intelligentiam observandum est in Scholis bonum morale aliquando latius, aliquando strictius sumi. Bonum morale late sumptum significat omne illud quod sic a voluntate & ratione pendet, & utramque afficit, ut propterea homini praemium, vel laus aliqua debeatur, & ejus respectu homo simpliciter bonus denominari possit. Adeoque bonum illud totum situm est in virtute & actionibus secundum virtutem, sive virtus illa sit acquisita, sive infusa, sive ordinis naturalis, sive ordinis supernaturalis.