Bellarmine denies that freed choice acts by strength it already had; he rejects Chemnitz's account (cap. 13)
It should also be noted that when Bellarmine says man's freedom regarding spiritual good was bound by sin, not extinguished, he does not mean that free choice, set loose by grace and consenting to good and pursuing it, does so by strength it already had and not by strength newly supplied by grace. That would be like a man whose chains are taken off: when he walks, he does so by strength he already had, which was not newly added to him, only its use held back by some hindrance.
In fact he complains that Chemnitz fraudulently and deceptively attributes something like this to the Catholic doctors. 'Chemnitz writes,' he says, 'that the Catholics hold that free choice, roused by grace, puts forth the strength it had even before it was roused, and by that strength of its own consents to God's call, so that prevenient grace does not give strength to free choice but only wakes it, as it were, from sleep.
The Catholics do not think this. They do acknowledge free choice in man even before divine grace goes before him, since free choice is a natural thing and is not lost through sin. But they do not say or think that free choice has any power, at least any proximate power, for acts of piety; it receives that from God through prevenient grace.' Chapter 13, answer to the first argument.
Latin
X. Praeterea vero notandum est, quum Bellarminus dicit libertatem hominis circa bonum spirituale per peccatum fuisse ligatam, non extinctam, mentem ejus non esse, quod liberum arbitrium per gratiam solutum, & bono consentiens, atque illud prosequens, id faciat per vires quas jam ante habebat, non quas gratia de novo ipsi suppeditavit: sicut homo cujus soluta sunt vincula, dum ambulat id facit per vires quas jam ante habebat, & quae de novo ipsi non sunt additae, sed solum quarum usus impedimento quodam cohibebatur. Queritur enim Kemnitium per fraudem & deceptionem simile quid Catholicis Doctoribus imputare. Scribit Kemnitius, inquit, Catholicos in ea sententia esse, ut liberum arbitrium per gratiam excitatum exerat vires quas habebat, etiam antequam excitaretur, & per illas suas vires vocationi divinae consentiat: ita ut gratia praeveniens non tribuat vires libero arbitrio, sed quasi sopitas excitet. At non hoc sentiunt Catholici: sed agnoscunt quidem liberum arbitrium in homine, etiam antequam eum gratia divina praeveniat: quia liberum arbitrium est res naturalis, quae per peccatum non amittitur: sed tamen non dicunt, nec sentiunt liberum arbitrium habere potentiam ullam, saltem proximam, ad actus pietatis, sed eam accipere a Deo per gratiam praevenientem. Cap. 13. Responsione ad primum argumentum.