So for Strang, in conversion and works of grace man keeps only essential freedom, not indifference
On this man's teaching, then, in most of what he does in this life man enjoys the freedom that consists in the power to determine himself to either of two opposites. But with respect to many other acts that are absolutely predefined by God's decree he does not keep that freedom, only the freedom that consists in acting willingly and by the judgement of his own reason.
He thinks this holds above all in man's conversion to God and in the works of grace. 'Without God's predetermination,' he says, 'a man cannot be converted and cannot act piously; and once the predetermination of grace is in place, he cannot fail to be converted and cannot fail to act piously. So although we acknowledge that the freedom essential to the will remains in those works, we deny that freedom in the stricter sense has any place there.'
Latin
XVI. Proinde secundum hujus viri doctrinam, quanquam homo in pluribus quae in hac vita degens agit, illa libertate gaudeat quae sita est in potestate ad opposita se determinandi; plurium tamen aliorum respectu quae sunt absolute Dei decreto praedefinita, libertatem eam non retinet, sed eam solum quae in eo sita est quod homo libens agit, & ex rationis propriae judicio. Quod praecipue locum habere putat in conversione hominis ad Deum & operibus gratiae. Nam, inquit, citra praedeterminationem Dei non potest homo converti, non potest pie agere; & posita praedeterminatione gratiae, non potest non converti, non potest non pie agere. Proinde in illis operibus etsi agnoscamus manere libertatem, quae voluntati est essentialis, tamen libertatem in strictiore isto sensu usurpatam illic locum habere negamus.