Strang's two freedoms: the essential freedom of spontaneous rational motion survives absolute decrees; indifference does not
To reconcile the divine decrees with the freedom of the human will, he distinguishes two kinds of freedom of the will. One, taken more broadly and commonly, is essential to the will: it consists in the will's being moved by its own motion and by a definite judgement of reason. The other, taken in a stricter sense, he locates in a kind of indifference of the will toward two or more opposites.
He admits that the decrees of God by which acts of the will are absolutely predefined remove this second freedom, since they predetermine the will to one thing and no longer leave it indifferent to act or not act.
But on his view they do not deprive the will of the first freedom. It fits perfectly well that the will should follow the judgement of reason and be carried by a motion in keeping with its nature, and yet be predefined by God to act and predetermined in time. For God moves the will gently, in a way that suits and befits the will's nature.
Latin
XIV. Ut autem decreta divina cum voluntatis humanae libertate conciliet, duplicem voluntatis libertatem distinguit. Unam latius & communius sumptam, quae voluntati essentialis est, & in eo consistit quod voluntas proprio suo motu, certoque rationis judicio movetur: Alteram sensu strictiore acceptam, quam constituit in quadam voluntatis indifferentia ad opposita duo vel plura. Decreta Dei quibus absolute voluntatis actus praedefiniti sunt, fatetur hanc posteriorem libertatem tollere, quandoquidem voluntatem ad unum praedeterminant, nec sinunt amplius eam indifferentem ut agat vel non agat: sed ex ejus sententia voluntatem non privant libertate priori, quia haec optime consistunt, ut voluntas rationis judicium sequatur, & motu naturae suae consentaneo feratur, & tamen ad agendum a Deo praedefinita, & in tempore praedeterminata sit; quoniam scilicet, Deus voluntatem movet suaviter, & eo modo qui congruit & conveniens est naturae voluntatis.