Vasquez accepts conditional foreknowledge but not that the decrees precede absolute foresight, lest antecedent necessity follow
Gabriel Vasquez, however, is not satisfied with this solution of the difficulty. He accepts what the authors of the view just set out say: that before God frames his decrees about free acts, he foreknows by a kind of conditional knowledge which way the will would lean and what it would determine itself to, if these or those circumstances were in place.
What he cannot accept is what they do not hesitate to grant, namely that God's decrees about free acts come in God, according to our way of conceiving, before his absolute foresight of that same will's determination. If it is granted that God in any way foreordained the acts of our will before he absolutely foreknows what its inclination and determination will be, Vasquez thinks there arises from this a kind of antecedent necessity that is incompatible with the freedom of future acts.
Latin
XXXIII. Non tamen haec difficultatis istius solutio satisfacit Gabrieli Vasquez. Probat quidem ille quod dicunt authores sententiae modo expositae, Deum antequam decreta sua condat circa actus liberos, per scientiam quandam conditionatam praescire quo voluntas sit inclinatura, & ad quid se determinatura, si ponantur istae vel illae circumstantiae: sed probare non potest quod concedere non verentur, nempe decreta Dei de actibus liberis in Deo priora esse, secundum nostrum concipiendi modum, absoluta praevisione determinationis ejusdem voluntatis. Nam si concedatur Deum quacunque ratione actus voluntatis nostrae praefinivisse, priusquam absolute praesciat quae futura sit voluntatis inclinatio, & determinatio, putat inde oriri necessitatem quandam antecedentem, quae futurorum actuum libertati repugnat.