Indifference opposed to necessity is of freedom's essence; indetermination implying potentiality is not
It is objected that the predetermination of the divine decree to this or that act takes from the will its indifference to acting, in which freedom lies. Alvarez answers that the indifference opposed to being determined to one thing by necessity does belong to the essence of freedom.
Free choice has this indifference even at the moment when God efficaciously predetermines it to act, indeed at the very moment it acts. What does not belong to the essence of freedom is indetermination in the sense that implies potentiality and the lack of a second act, and that is opposed to being determined to one side in the manner proper to freedom, which consists in a capacity for either side.
Latin
XV. Ad id vero quod objicitur praedeterminationem decreti divini ad hunc aut illum actum ex voluntate tollere indifferentiam ad operandum, in qua indifferentia posita est libertas: Respondet, Indifferentiam quae opponitur Determinationi ad unum ex necessitate, esse de essentia libertatis & hanc habere liberum arbitrium etiam in eo instanti, quo efficaciter praedeterminatur a Deo ad operandum; imo in ipso instanti quo operatur, non autem esse de essentia libertatis indeterminationem, ut importat potentialitatem, & privationem actus secundi, & ut opponitur determinationi ad alteram partem per modum libertatis, qui in facultate ad utrumlibet consistit.