Even predeterminists must grant it, as Twisse concedes on Suarez's reading of the conditionals
Those who hold that creatures can perform no action without God's prior, predetermining concurrence cannot deny this proposition either, which follows from the one before. Plainly God cannot fail to know what each possible creature would do if he willed not only to create it but also to apply it to act and predetermine it.
Twisse admits as much. He notes that Suarez teaches that the conditional propositions about contingent futures that are the object of God's knowledge include God's will in the antecedent: that is, if God himself willed such an effect, or at least willed to permit it and to concur with it. Twisse then adds: 'In this sense we grant that the conditionals the Jesuits invent do hold.' Dissertation on middle knowledge, book 3, page 465.
Latin
L. Hanc etiam propositionem, quae ex praecedenti sequitur, negare non possunt illi qui sine Dei concursu praevio & praedeterminante, nullam a creaturis actionem edi posse putant. Manifestum est enim, fieri non posse quin Deus cognoscat, quid acturae essent singulae creaturae possibiles, si vellet eas non tantum creare, sed etiam ad agendum applicare & praedeterminare. Istud fatetur Tuissus, qui postquam observavit Suarezium docere propositiones conditionatas de futuris contingentibus, quae sunt objectum scientiae divinae, includere in antecedente voluntatem divinam, scilicet, si ipsa velit talem effectum, vel saltem velit illum permittere, & ad illum concurrere, subjungit, Juxta hunc sensum concedimus conditionales illas obtinere quas fingunt Jesuitae. Dissertatione de scientia Media, lib. 3. pag. 465.