Yet a decree is included in the condition: not one already made, but one supposed to be made
This knowledge comes before any free decree in God. Even so, as is clear from what has been said, the condition under which something is said to be future includes a decree. It is not a decree conceived as actually present in God, but one that would necessarily have to be posited in God for that thing to be able to exist.
So the conditional futurity that is the object of this knowledge still depends on a decree of God. It does not depend on a decree already made, but on one supposed to be made by God, so that the thing can truly be called future. In our human way, God is imagined reasoning with himself: 'If I decreed to create this angel or this man and not to withdraw my concurrence from him, in such an arrangement of things he would do this and nothing else, though he could act otherwise.'
Latin
IV. Quanquam autem ista scientia liberum quodvis decretum in Deo antecedat; nihilominus, ut patet ex dictis, in conditione sub qua res futura dicitur, includitur decretum, non quidem quod actu Deo inesse concipiatur, sed quod necessario in Deo ponendum esset ad hoc, ut res illa esse posset. Ac proinde conditionata illa futuritio, quae scientiae hujus objectum est, non desinit a quodam Dei decreto pendere: Verum non a decreto jam facto, sed quod faciendum a Deo supponitur, ut res illa vere futura dici possit. Nimirum more nostro Deus concipitur sic apud se cogitans, Si decernerem hunc Angelum, vel hominem creare, & concursum meum illi non subtrahere, in tali rerum dispositione hoc ageret, & non aliud; quanquam posset aliter agere.