Against the proximate-cause view: certainty in circumstances implies a necessity, and would excuse Adam
Nor do I see how the future act of a free cause can be foreknown with certainty within that cause, considered in the circumstances that are to dispose it most immediately to act. That could only be if we presuppose that some necessity of acting in that way is laid upon it by the object being set before it in such circumstances. That too brings no small difficulty with it.
It would follow that Adam, affected and disposed as he was before he sinned, had a necessity of sinning laid on him by the temptation put before him and the circumstances that went with it. This can scarcely be granted without his seeming to be excused from blame.
Latin
XXXIX. Neque etiam intelligo quomodo futuri actus causae liberae, in ea certo praecognosci possint, prout consideratur in iis circumstantiis, quibus est ad agendum proxime disponenda; nisi praesupponamus, illi quandam sic agendi necessitatem imponi, ex objecti propositione sub talibus circumstantiis; quod secum quoque non parvam difficultatem trahit. Nam inde sequitur Adamo, prout ante peccatum affectus & dispositus erat, necessitatem peccandi impositam fuisse per tentationem quae illi oblata est, & circumstantias quae illam comitabantur: quod aegre admitti potest, quin videatur a culpa excusandus.