Both reject predetermination as contrary to freedom; Strang's two senses of freedom
Both men also hold that this predetermination should be rejected because it damages the freedom of the will and does not seem capable of being reconciled with it.
Strang does, however, distinguish two senses of freedom (De voluntate Dei circa peccatum, book 2, chapter 8). Freedom in the broader sense is essential to the will and is found in any act done willingly and with reason. Freedom in the stricter sense consists in a certain indifference on the agent's part and belongs to the will with respect to most of its acts. On his view, the divine premotion and predetermination by which God moves human beings gently, in a way suited to an intelligent creature, does not overturn the first kind of freedom. It cannot, however, coexist with the stricter kind, since that freedom lies in indifference, which any prior determination not within the will's own power contradicts.
How God's simultaneous concurrence, always ready for the created will, does no harm to freedom of that kind has been explained above. These theologians reconcile it with freedom in the strict sense in just the same way as the teachers of the Roman School.
Latin
XXXIX. Sed uterque praeterea istam praedeterminationem eo nomine rejiciendam putat quod libertati Voluntatis officit, nec videtur cum ea conciliari posse. * Distinguit tamen Strangius inter libertatem latius acceptam quae Voluntati essentialis est, & quae reperitur in quolibet actu qui fit sponte & cum ratione; & inter libertatem strictiore sensu sumptam, quae consistit in quadam agentis indifferentia, & Voluntati respectu plerorumque ipsius actuum competit. Priorem illam libertatem non evertit, juxta ipsum, divina praemotio & praedeterminatio, qua Deus homines suaviter movet, & prout creaturae intelligenti consentaneum est: sed tamen cum strictiore ista libertate consistere nequit, ut quae posita sit in indifferentia, cum qua pugnat antecedens quaevis determinatio, & quae in Voluntatis ipsius potestate non sit. Quomodo vero tali libertati nihil noceat concursus ille Dei simultaneus, & qui semper praesto est creatae Voluntati, superius expositum fuit. Nec Theologi isti eum cum stricte dicta voluntatis libertate aliter conciliant quam Scholae Romanae Doctores. * Strangius de Voluntat. Dei circa peccatum, lib. 2. cap. 8.