What Strang means by premotion, and where he allows it
By that premotion and predetermination, he explains, he means the action by which God stirs and applies the secondary cause to act. Prior by nature and by reason to the creature's acting, God really and efficaciously moves it to each of its actions, acting and bringing it about that the creature acts and does whatever it acts and does. Without this premotion of God the creature can do nothing whatever; once it is given, it is impossible in the composite sense for the secondary cause not to do what the first cause premoves it to.
Strang grants that God does use premotion and predetermination of this kind for the works of grace and for very many other operations of the will, whenever he pleases and there is need. But he denies that it belongs to God's common concurrence or is applied across the board to all the actions of creatures, especially those to which sin is necessarily attached (book 2, chapter 4, near the end).
Latin
XXXVII. Per praemotionem autem & praedeterminationem illam declarat se intelligere actionem Dei, qua Deus ciet & applicat secundam causam ad agendum, adeoque prius natura & ratione quam creatura operetur, eam realiter & efficaciter movet ad singulas ejus actiones; agens & faciens ut creatura agat & faciat quicquid illa agit & facit: ita ut sine hac Dei praemotione nihil prorsus possit agere creatura; illa vero posita, impossibile sit in sensu composito causam secundam illud non agere ad quod a causa prima praemovetur. Ejusmodi praemotionem & praedeterminationem agnoscit quidem ille a Deo adhiberi ad opera gratiae, & ad plurimas alias Voluntatis operationes, nempe quandocunque ipsi libet & opus est: negat tamen eam ad communem Dei concursum spectare, aut universe adhiberi ad omnes creaturarum actiones, praesertim eas quibus peccatum necessario annexum est. Lib. 2. cap. 4. sub finem.