On the Molinist account concurrence harms neither freedom of exercise nor freedom of specification
These teachers believe that their account of divine concurrence lets them show easily how it can be reconciled with the freedom of human acts.
Two kinds of freedom are usually ascribed to the will: freedom as to the exercise of the act and freedom as to its specification. Concurrence understood in their way takes nothing from either. It does not impair freedom of exercise, since it lays no necessity of acting on the will. The will does not act because God acts; rather, God acts because the will acts, even though God and the will begin to act at the same moment of time and of nature. In the language of the Schools they put it this way: the will acts prior by nature to God, not with the priority of the instant 'in which' but of the instant 'from which'.
Latin
XXXI. Doctores autem illi ex hac sua concursus divini explicatione, putant se facile ostendere posse, quomodo cum actuum humanorum libertate concursus ille conciliari possit. Cum enim duplex tribui soleat voluntati libertas, una scilicet, quoad exercitium actus, & altera quoad ejus specificationem, neutri quicquam praejudicat concursus divinus ita explicatus. Non priori quae est quoad exercitium, quandoquidem iste concursus necessitatem agendi voluntati non imponit: si quidem voluntas non operatur quia Deus operatur, sed potius e converso ideo Deus operatur, quia Voluntas operatur; quamvis alioqui in eodem momento temporis & naturae, Deus & Voluntas operari incipiant. Quod Scholasticis vocibus sic exprimunt, voluntatem prius natura operari quam Deum, non prioritate instantis in quo, sed a quo.