So the secondary cause is not moved or determined by God; God's concurrence is indifferent and is determined by the creature
They also deny, as plainly follows from the foregoing, that the first cause moves the secondary cause to act or determines it, in acting, to produce a given action.
On their view, then, the secondary cause, and so the will, does not act because God moves it and applies it to act; rather, God cooperates with it because it sets itself to act. God's concurrence and influence is of itself indifferent, and it is the secondary causes that determine it to the various kinds of action.
Latin
XXIX. Praeterea, quod etiam manifeste sequitur ex dictis, negant causam secundam a causa prima ad agendum moveri, aut ab eadem in agendo ad talem actionem edendam determinari. Adeoque, juxta eorum sententiam, causa secunda, & proinde voluntas, non ideo operatur quia Deus illam movet, & applicat ad agendum: sed potius Deus illi cooperatur, quia ipsa sese ad agendum disponit. Concursus autem & influxus divinus est aliquid ex se indifferens, quod a causis secundis ad varias actionum species determinatur.