Alvarez's other reconciliation: the premotion is needed to act actually, not to be able to act
Alvarez, however, tries another way to reconcile the physical predetermination of the human will to each of its acts by the impulse of God moving it with the will's free choice.
He sets himself this objection: 'If God's prior influence on the cause is necessary for the will to act, it follows that without it the will cannot act, and so its freedom is lost.' He replies: 'That prior motion, or immediate influence on the cause, is not needed for the will to be able to act if it wishes; it has that through its own power, or through supernatural habits. It is needed only for the will actually to act. So from the fact that God does not move the will by that prior motion, it does not follow that the will cannot will or act; it follows only that it will not in fact act.'
Latin
XXIV. Alia tamen ratione conciliare conatur Alvares Physicam illam Voluntatis humanae praedeterminationem ad actus ipsius singulos per Dei moventis impulsum, cum libera ejusdem Voluntatis electione. Postquam enim hanc sibi objectionem proposuit, si praevius ille Dei influxus in causam est necessarius, ut Voluntas operetur, sequitur quod sine illo operari non possit, & ita peribit ejus libertas, Respondet, Praevia illa motio, sive influxus immediatus in causam, non est necessarius ut Voluntas possit operari, si velit; id enim habet per propriam Virtutem, aut per habitus supernaturales; sed solum est necessarius ut actualiter operetur. Unde ex eo quod voluntas non moveatur a Deo praevia illa motione, non sequitur quod non possit velle, aut operari; sed solum infertur quod de facto non sit operatura.