The difficulty: how can premotion consist with created freedom?
Since on their view this divine premotion applies to free agents no less than to necessary ones, a considerable difficulty arises: how can it be reconciled with the freedom of creatures?
If our will can do nothing unless God first moves it and applies it to its work, how can it be considered mistress of its own act and indifferent to acting or not acting, when the divine motion and application required beforehand for each of its acts is not in its power? And again, when God moves the will and applies it to its work, how can the will be said to act freely, when it can neither refrain from acting nor resist the divine motion?
Latin
XIII. Cum vero juxta eorum sententiam, divina ista praemotio locum habeat non minus in agentibus liberis quam in necessariis, inde oritur non parva difficultas, quomodo illud cum creaturarum libertate constare possit. Si enim Voluntas nostra nihil agere potest, nisi a Deo prius moveatur, atque ad opus applicetur, quomodo censeri poterit domina sui actus, & indifferens esse ad agendum, vel non agendum; quandoquidem non habet in sua potestate divinam illam motionem & applicationem, quae ad singulos ejus actus praerequiritur? Et rursus quum Deus Voluntatem movet & applicat ad opus, qui possit dici Voluntas libere operari, cum non possit non operari, & motioni divinae resistere?