So the deniers reject only two things, and the defenders of indifference grant both
This makes it plain that when these theologians deny that freedom consists in some indifference of the agent, they have only two things in view. First, freedom does not consist in a wavering state in which the person called free leans no more toward acting than toward not acting. Second, once God's grace and providence are at work with their motion and efficacy, and the agent's own judgment has given its dictate, the free agent cannot fail to do what God's effective motion and his own judgment drive him to. Both points are readily admitted by those Reformed who teach that freedom of choice includes a certain indifference toward acting.
What has been said shows just as clearly that the teachers who defend that indifference have only this in mind: God's motion and the mind's practical judgment move a man to act in such a way that, on the one hand, he acts surely and infallibly and, on the other, he is not deprived of the ability not to act or to act otherwise. In the same way, when a man actually acts, the act he has been moved and driven to does not take that ability from him.
Latin
XXVIII. Unde patet hos Theologos, quum negant libertatem consistere in quadam agentis indifferentia, duo tantum ob oculos habere, quorum unum est libertatem non consistere in ejus qui liber dicitur ancipiti statu, in quo non magis inclinat & propendet ad agendum, quam ad non agendum: alterum, posita gratiae & providentiae divinae motione & efficacia, & etiam proprii judicii dictamine, contingere non posse ut agens liberum non agat id ad quod, tum efficaci illa motione Dei, tum judicio proprio, impellitur; quod utrumque ultro fatentur illi ex Reformatis qui docent arbitrii libertate includi quandam ad agendum indifferentiam. Et Rursus ex dictis non minus evidens est Doctores illos qui tuentur istam indifferentiam hoc solum in animo habere quod divina motio, & practicae mentis judicium sic hominem ad agendum movent, ut ex una parte quidem certo & infallibiliter agat, ex altera tamen non tollatur ab eo facultas non agendi, aut aliter agendi. Non secus ac quum homo reipsa agit, eadem facultas non tollitur ab eo per actum ipsum ad quem motus & impulsus est.