What the defenders of indifference mean: not equipoise, but a true intrinsic power to act otherwise
Those who hold that freedom never exists without some indifference in the free agent do not mean by indifference a state in which the agent leans no more one way than the other and hangs in the balance, equally ready to be pushed either way. That is the very thing their opponents most object to.
None of the defenders of this indifference fails to hold that it is present even in someone who has decided, with firm and sure judgment, that he must do this and nothing else, and whose will is carried with great force in one direction by deep-rooted habits he could shake off only with the utmost difficulty.
In this matter, then, by indifference they mean simply a real, intrinsic power not only to act but also to stop acting, not only to do this but also to do something else or its opposite. That power is found not only in someone who is unsure and torn over whether to act, but also in someone who has no hesitation or doubt about what he should or should not do, and who sets himself, with a fixed and steady purpose, to act in this way and no other.
Latin
XXIV. Nam qui volunt libertatem non esse sine aliqua agentis liberi indifferentia, per indifferentiam non intelligunt eum statum in quo agens non inclinat in unam partem magis quam in aliam, sed stat in ancipiti aequali momento huc illuc impellendum quod contrasentientes maxime aversantur. Nec enim ullus est eorum qui tuentur istam indifferentiam, qui non censeat illam in eo quoque reperiri, qui firmo certoque judicio hoc & non aliud sibi agendum esse constituit: & cujus quoque voluntas, habitibus alte radicatis, & quos aegerrime excutere potest, in hanc, aut illam partem vehementissime fertur. Adeoque nomine indifferentiae, in hoc negotio, non aliud designant, quam potentiam veram & intrinsecam non tantum agendi, sed & ab actione cessandi, non tantum hoc agendi, sed & diversum, vel oppositum ejus. Quae potentia non solum in eo reperitur qui dubius & anceps est an agat, vel non agat, sed in eo etiam qui nullo modo haesitat & dubitat de eo quod sibi agendum sive non agendum est, quique proposito fixo, & immoto ad sic & non aliter agendum sese determinat.