Grace, providence and the last practical dictate determine infallibly, yet the power not to act remains
So they do grant that the motion of God's grace, the efficacy of his providence too, or even the practical judgment's last dictate, determines a man to act and to will in such a way that the act called free follows necessarily. Once God's grace and providence are at work with their motion and efficacy, the act toward which God prepares, moves and determines the man, whether by the motion of grace or by the efficacy of common providence, cannot fail to be put forth.
But they do not count this as necessity in the proper sense, because a real power not to act coexists with it. When God calls a man according to his purpose, he moves him to believe God and to love God and his neighbour in such a way that faith and love follow infallibly, and with that motion in place the man cannot fail to believe and love. Yet God does not take away his power not to believe and not to love. The act contrary to the divine motion cannot coexist with it, but the power to that contrary act does.
In the same way a seated man must be sitting while he sits and a walking man must be walking while he walks; it is impossible for a seated man not to sit or for a walking man not to walk. Yet the seated man keeps a real power to walk and the walker a real power to sit. This holds not in the composite sense, as if they could walk and stand at once, but in the divided sense, because any act, while it excludes the opposite act, does not exclude the potency for it.
Latin
XVII. Itaque concedunt quidem motionem gratiae divinae, & providentiae quoque divinae efficaciam, aut etiam ultimum dictamen judicii practici, sic hominem ad agendum & volendum determinare, ut necessario sequatur actio quae libera dicitur, & impossibile sit ut posita providentiae & gratiae divinae motione & efficacia, non exeratur actus ille ad quem Deus sive per motionem gratiae, sive per providentiae communis efficaciam, hominem praeparat, movet, & determinat. Sed necessitatem istam non habent pro proprie dicta, quoniam cum illa stat vera non agendi potestas. Nempe Deus hominem, quem secundum propositum vocat, sic movet ad credendum Deo, & diligendum Deum & proximum, ut licet infallibiliter inde sequatur fides & dilectio, & posita tali motione, impossibile sit hominem non credere atque diligere, non tamen ab eo tollat potestatem non credendi, & non diligendi, quia cum motione divina non potest quidem compati actus illi contrarius, sed cum ea tamen consistit potestas ad actum contrarium. Non secus ac necesse est sedentem, dum sedet sedere, & ambulantem, dum ambulat, ambulare, & impossibile est ut sedens non sedeat, & ut ambulans non ambulet; & nihilominus manet in sedente vera potestas ambulandi, & in ambulante potestas sedendi; non quidem in sensu composito quasi simul possent ambulare & stare, sed in sensu diviso, quoniam quilibet actus, licet excludat actum oppositum, non tamen excludit potentiam ad illum.