Strang concedes it would be a mere war of words (De voluntate Dei III.14, p. 687)
Among those who teach that freedom in general is opposed not to necessity but to compulsion, the Reformed teacher John Strang says this in so many words. He first argued at length that the will is free not only in dealing with means but also in dealing with the end, so that God loves himself freely and men freely will to be happy, since freedom of the will in general is nothing but intellectual spontaneity.
He then admitted that freedom is also used in a narrower sense, for what concerns τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, the things in our power, and limited to means ordered to the end, or to things that contribute little or nothing to the end. In that respect freedom includes a certain indifference, and free acts are purely contingent. He further noted that many deny, in this sense, that God loves himself freely or that the blessed in heaven love God freely.
He finally concludes: 'We do not think this matter worth a quarrel, since it would otherwise be a mere war of words (λογομαχία). For we do not deny that the term free choice is properly used in that way, although in another sense we have called those actions free.' (De voluntate Dei, book 3, chapter 14, page 687.)
Latin
XIII. Et revera inter eos qui docent libertatem in genere oppositam esse non necessitati sed coactioni, id diserte affirmat Strangius Scholae Reformatae Doctor. Postquam enim multis docuit voluntatem liberam esse non tantum quum versatur circa media, sed etiam quum versatur circa finem, ac proinde Deum libere se amare, & homines libere velle esse foelices, quia libertas voluntatis in genere non est aliud quam spontaneum intellectuale: Et postea fassus est libertatem strictius etiam usurpari, prout versatur circa τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, id est, ea quae sunt in nostra potestate, & restringitur ad media relata ad finem, aut ad ea quae parum, aut nihil ad finem conducunt, quo respectu libertas includit quandam indifferentiam, & actus liberi sunt mere contingentes; Deinde quoque observavit in hoc sensu a multis negari quod Deus libere se amet, & beati in coelo libere Deum diligant, concludit tandem his verbis, Neque nobis videtur hac de re litigandum, quia alioqui tantum esset λογομαχία, non enim negamus, sic vocem liberi arbitrii recte usurpari, quanquam in alio sensu illas actiones diximus esse liberas. De voluntate Dei lib. 3. cap. 14. pag. 687.