Those who oppose freedom to necessity grant some necessary acts and a willingness or complacency in them
Those who hold the opposite, that freedom is opposed not only to compulsion but to necessity as well, concede to the theologians who disagree that the will, or free agent, stands necessarily toward some of its acts, though it stands contingently toward most of the others.
They also think the will is free only with respect to the acts it produces contingently rather than necessarily. Yet they recognize that even in the acts on which the will is fixed unchangeably and necessarily there is a certain willingness and complacency of the will. When the will turns back on its act it approves it and gives itself the order, since it does not simply will but also wills its own willing and rests content in its act.
Latin
X. Qui vero contra pertendunt, libertatem opponi non coactioni solum, sed etiam necessitati, Theologis diversum sentientibus concedunt voluntatem, seu agens liberum, suorum quorundam actuum ratione habere se necessario; quamvis plerorumque aliorum respectu sese habeat contingenter. Ac praeterea quanquam existiment voluntatem liberam esse respectu tantum eorum actuum qui non necessario, sed contingenter ab ea eliciuntur, nihilominus agnoscunt in illis ipsis actibus ad quos voluntas immutabiliter & necessario determinata est, esse quandam voluntatis libentiam & complacentiam, quae in eo consistit, quod, dum voluntas in suum actum reflectitur, illum probat & sibi imperat, quatenus, scilicet, non vult simpliciter, sed etiam vult se velle, & in proprio actu acquiescit.