They also grant that most free acts are not fixed on one course but contingent
Besides, although they think that in a rational agent only compulsion stands in the way of freedom, and necessity does not, they still recognize that in most of their acts free agents are not only free from compulsion but are also not fixed on one course by any necessity.
So, on their account, some of a free creature's acts are necessary, but most are contingent.
Latin
VII. Ac praeterea, quanquam existiment solam coactionem in agente rationali libertati officere, non vero necessitatem, nihilominus agnoscunt agentia libera in plerisque suis actibus, non solum immunia esse a coactione, sed neque esse ad unum necessitate quadam determinata. Adeoque inter actus creaturae liberae, ex eorum sensu nonnulli quidem necessarii sunt, sed plerique tamen contingentes.