Dissent: Durandus and Gassendi; Placaeus and Amyraut; Le Blanc's view that the subject of freedom is the man
Just as some Reformed teachers depart from that more common view, it has also had critics in the Roman School, both long ago and recently: Durandus in the past and Gassendi now. In their view freedom is not in the will alone but in the intellect as well, and indeed more, and first, in the intellect than in the will.
Admittedly the Reformed teachers handle this question more freely, and their senses and opinions vary more widely. Some make freedom common to will and intellect, yet hold that it belongs with the stronger claim to the will, as Josué de la Place (Placaeus) does, while others give that claim to the intellect, which is the view of Moïse Amyraut.
Others insist that freedom is not a property of one faculty or another but something that arises in man from several faculties working together and bearing on one another. Its proper subject is then neither this faculty nor that but simply the man, insofar as he uses his intellect and will in a certain way. We take this view too, since a man is free not simply insofar as he wills, nor simply insofar as he judges, but insofar as he desires and wills on the basis of his mind's deliberate judgment and a settled counsel of reason.
Latin
V. Verum sicut ab ista communiori sententia nonnulli Doctores Reformati recedunt, ita quoque & nuper, & olim, habuit illa in Schola Romana contradictores; olim quidem Durandum, nuper vero Gassendum, ex quorum sententia libertas non est in sola voluntate, sed etiam in intellectu; imo potius & prius in intellectu quam in voluntate. Quanquam fatendum est Doctores Reformatos in hac quaestione liberius versari, & majori cum diversitate sensuum & opinionum; dum alii libertatem ita communem faciunt voluntati & intellectui, ut tamen, juxta hos, ut Josuam Placeum, potiori jure ad voluntatem pertineat, juxta alios vero, ad intellectum, quae est sententia Mosis Amyraldi. Alii vero pertendunt libertatem non esse affectionem hujus aut illius facultatis, sed aliquid ex plurium facultatum concursu, & relatione mutua in homine oriens: adeoque subjectum libertatis proprie non esse hanc, aut illam facultatem, sed simpliciter hominem, quatenus intellectu & voluntate sua certo modo utitur. Ad quam sententiam nos quoque accedimus, quandoquidem homo liber est non simpliciter quatenus vult, nec simpliciter quatenus judicat; sed quatenus ex mentis judicio deliberato, & certo rationis consilio appetit & vult.