Theological Theses · §1851 · Louis Le Blanc de Beaulieu

Both Schools agree free choice is a faculty, not really distinct from intellect and will; two questions remain

Second, what we set out earlier makes it clear that both schools agree that free choice is neither an act nor a habit but belongs among the soul's faculties, and yet is not a faculty really distinct from intellect and will.

The questions of any weight now raised about the nature of man's free choice come down to two. With respect to which faculty is man said to have free choice? And what does the freedom consist in, on account of which our choice is called free?

Latin

II. Secundo patet ex iis quae ante fuerunt a nobis exposita, utramque scholam in eo convenire quod liberum arbitrium non sit actus, aut habitus aliquis, sed ad facultates animae pertineat: neque tamen sit facultas quaedam reapse ab intellectu & voluntate distincta. Quae autem hodie de liberi arbitrii in homine natura quaestiones moventur alicujus momenti, ad hasce revocari possunt. Cujus facultatis respectu homo dicatur esse liberi Arbitrii? Deinde, Qua in re sita sit libertas a qua liberum in nobis dicitur arbitrium?

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