They distinguish willingness or complacency from liberty, which is of contrariety or of contradiction
They thus separate willingness, or complacency, from freedom. They allow no freedom in the proper sense except two kinds.
One is freedom of contrariety or specification, by which a person can produce opposite acts toward the same object, or seek objects that are opposed or simply different. The other, at the least, is freedom of contradiction or exercise, by which a person can act and also hold back or check his action.
Latin
XL. Itaque libentiam, sive complacentiam distinguunt a libertate: nec volunt ullam esse libertatem proprie dictam, nisi eam quae sit, vel contrarietatis, seu specificationis, per quam aliquis potest circa idem objectum elicere actus contrarios, vel appetere objecta contraria sive disparata. Vel saltem contradictionis, sive exercitii, per quam possit aliquis agere, & actionem suam suspendere, sive inhibere.