Jansenius with Scotus: the necessity in such acts is concomitant, not antecedent
The necessity then present in the will, as he puts it in Scotus's words, 'does not come before the will, so that the will would be understood to fall under a necessity that drives it into the act and fixes it there. If that were so, the will would be acted upon and would not act, and freedom could not remain in such an act.
'It is a concomitant necessity, understood to fall under the will. The will, through the firmness of its freedom, lays necessity on itself in bringing forth its act and in persevering in it, that is, in fixing itself on the act.' (On the Grace of Christ the Saviour, book 6, chapter 37.)
Latin
XXXI. Etenim quae tum reperitur in voluntate necessitas, ut verbis Scoti mentem suam exprimit, non est praevia ad voluntatem, ut voluntas intelligatur cadere sub necessitate, tanquam impellente in actum, & figente in actum, quoniam si sic esset, voluntas ageretur & non ageret, nec staret in tali actu libertas. Sed est necessitas concomitans, ita quod ipsa intelligatur cadere sub voluntate, sic quod voluntas, propter firmitatem libertatis suae, sibi ipsi necessitatem imponit in eliciendo actum, & in perseverando, sive figendo, se in actum. De Grat. Chr. Salvat. lib. 6. cap. 37.