Aquinas: natural necessity does not conflict with freedom, which is opposed to violence or compulsion
Thomas Aquinas, another pupil of the same Alexander of Hales, held the same doctrine. 'Natural necessity,' he says, 'by which the will is said to will something necessarily, happiness for instance, does not conflict with freedom, as Augustine teaches in the first book of The City of God.
'Freedom of the will is opposed to violence or compulsion. There is no violence or compulsion when a thing moves according to the order of its own nature. Violence lies rather in hindering a natural motion, as when a heavy body is kept from falling toward the center.
'So the will seeks happiness freely, though it seeks it necessarily. In the same way God too loves himself freely by his will, even though he loves himself of necessity.' (De potentia, q. 10, art. 2, ad 1.)
Latin
XVII. Eandem etiam doctrinam secutus est, ejusdem Alexandri Halensis Discipulus alter, Thomas Aquinas. Nam naturalis necessitas, inquit, secundum quam voluntas aliquid ex necessitate velle dicitur ut felicitatem, libertati non repugnat, ut Augustinus docet in primo de civitate Dei. Libertas enim voluntatis violentiae, vel coactioni opponitur. Non est autem violentia, vel coactio in hoc quod aliquid secundum ordinem suae naturae movetur; sed magis in hoc quod naturalis motus impeditur: sicut cum impeditur grave ne descendat ad medium. Unde voluntas libere appetit felicitatem, licet necessario appetat illam. Sic autem & Deus sua voluntate libere amat seipsum, licet de necessitate amet seipsum. quaest. 10. de Potent. art. 2. ad 1.