Gassendi's mind free only as flexible toward objects; the intellect compared to a balance
He does not make the mind free in every respect. It is free only in that it stands somewhat indifferently toward a great many objects and is so pliable by nature that, while its object is truth, it can judge a matter now one way and now another and take now this judgment and now that one for true.
Yet it cannot refuse what appears true or accept what seems false. Nor can it change its judgment of anything unless the object presents a stronger or weaker appearance of truth or falsehood.
He therefore likens the human intellect to a pair of scales that tilts one way or the other as weight is added to or taken from either pan. Once one pan has gone down, it cannot rise again unless weight is put on the other.
The illustrious author develops this at greater length in the same volume, page 82.
Latin
VI. Porro mentem quovis respectu liberam esse non vult, sed tantum quatenus ad objecta plurima indifferenter quodammodo se habet, & sua natura ita flexilis est, ut verum pro objecto habens, possit nunc unum nunc aliud judicare de quapiam re, & nunc unum, nunc aliud judicium de ipsa pro vero habere: licet non possit ab eo quod verum apparet dissentire, nec ei quod falsum videtur assentiri, neque etiam de re aliqua judicium mutare, nisi ex parte objecti sese offerat major, vel minor species sive veri, sive falsi. Adeo ut intellectum humanum comparet librae, quae modo in hanc, modo in illam partem inclinatur, prout isti, vel illi lanci, aliquid ponderis accedit, vel decedit: & cujus altera Lanx semel depressa non potest attolli, nisi Lanci oppositae aliquid ponderis addatur, prout ista latius diducta videre est apud Virum illum Clarissimum tomo supra citato pag. 82.