Which power free choice is: a universal power, or a particular one distinct from intellect and will
Once free choice was granted to be a power, the next question was which power it is, and opinions differed.
Thomas and Bonaventure, on Bellarmine's testimony, report that some took it to be not one particular power of the soul but a universal power containing as its species every power of the soul, sentient or intellectual, that produces acts free in any way.
Others, such as Alexander of Hales, the noble scholastic who taught both Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure, called it a particular power but one distinct from intellect and will.
This question too can be left aside, for all the schools now agree that free choice is not anything really distinct from intellect and will.
Latin
III. Rursus posito quod liberum Arbitrium sit potentia quaedam, quaesitum est quae sit illa potentia, neque de hac re omnibus idem visum. Thomas & Bonaventura teste Bellarmino, referunt nonnullos sensisse liberum arbitrium non esse unicam & particularem animae potentiam, sed potius potentiam quandam universalem, quae sub se tanquam species complectatur omnes potentias animae, tum sentientis, tum intelligentis, quae actus quomodocunque liberos edunt. Alii vero ut Alexander Halensis Scholasticus nobilis ipsius Thomae Aquinatis & Bonaventurae praeceptor, dixerunt liberum arbitrium esse quidem potentiam quandam particularem, sed quae sit ab intellectu & voluntate distincta. Verum quaestio ista praetermitti quoque potest, quandoquidem in eo jam consentiunt omnes Scholae quod liberum arbitrium non sit quid ab intellectu & voluntate reapse distinctum.