Yet Amyraut concludes that freedom is formally in both faculties jointly, though the intellect's part is the weightier
Yet at the end of the same section he concludes that freedom, properly speaking, is not formally in the intellect or in the will taken separately, but in both faculties together. Man is not counted free simply in that he judges, nor simply in that he desires, but in that he desires on the judgement and counsel of reason. In the same way humanity is not formally in the understanding soul, nor in the sensitive nature alone, but in man as made up of those two natures.
On his view, then, free choice is not any one of the rational faculties in man, nor something with one part belonging more to the intellect and another more to the will. It is the character and disposition of both faculties, intellect and will, by which, as they work together on human actions, each in its own way, man as man is counted free.
Still, just as in defining man the element of reason counts far more than that of animal nature, so in defining free choice the intellect seems to weigh far more than appetite. Many other things desire, but among visible creatures man alone is thought to desire freely, because he alone has an intellect.
Latin
XL. Et tamen in ejusdem sectionis fine concludit libertatem, proprie loquendo, non esse formaliter, vel in intellectu, vel in voluntate, si seorsim considerentur, sed in utraque facultate conjunctim. Quia, scilicet, homo liber esse non censetur, neque simpliciter quatenus judicat, nec simpliciter quatenus appetit, sed quatenus appetit ex judicio atque consilio rationis. Quemadmodum humanitas neque formaliter est in anima intelligente, neque formaliter in sola natura sensitiva, sed in homine quatenus ex duabus illis naturis componitur. Ac proinde, juxta illius sententiam, liberum arbitrium non est una quaepiam e facultatibus rationalibus quae in homine sunt; nec etiam quicquam tale cujus una pars potius ad intellectum, altera potius ad voluntatem pertineat: sed est utriusque facultatis, intellectus, scilicet, ac voluntatis, ea indoles atque affectio, secundum quam concurrentes, quaeque pro ingenio suo, ad actiones hominis, fit ut homo, quatenus homo est, liber esse censeatur. Quanquam, quemadmodum in definitione hominis, rationis quam naturae animalis consideratio longe magis excellit, sic in definitione liberi arbitrii, intellectus quam appetitus ratio longe potior esse videtur. Convenit enim multis aliis rebus ut appetant, unus homo inter creaturas aspectabiles, quia solus est praeditus intellectu, libere appetere putatur.